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The Final Frontier: A Proposed Legal
Order for an American Space
Settlement
Are we not now ... living in a period of deceptive quiet-the first
few seconds, relatively, of the Space Age? In our daily lives few of
us are much aware of Space Age problems that demand intelligent
answers.... Only now are we beginning to realize the vast eco-
nomic and social implications of the Space program for the multi-
tude of us who have no present intention of riding a rocket to the
moon or Mars.1
Introduction
A pilgrimage to the stars may seem a remote possibility, but in fact,
the United States will soon establish a permanent human presence in
space.2 The United States can no longer ignore the effects this settlement
will have upon life on Earth, or upon an American future in space. The
United States should begin to address the potential problems arising
from space settlement by designing a legal system which will circumvent
the chaotic effects of space anarchy.
Current federal policy, which encourages private investment and
participation in space exploration and settlement,3 reflects the impor-
tance of private resources to the development and expansion of a space
community. Yet, before private participation can occur, the federal gov-
ernment must lay a foundation upon which space settlement can be real-
ized-a foundation which accounts for an environment that differs
radically from the Earth.
Since space exploration and settlement can be viewed as an exten-
sion into space of the boundaries of nations on Earth, space settlement
will also have international ramifications. Developing an appropriate
American system for governing space activity requires consideration of
both international and domestic political structures and how they affect
1. E. LINDAMAN, SPACE: A NEW DIRECTION FOR MANKIND 115 (Ist ed. 1969) (quot-
ing Joseph A. Beirne, President of the Communications Workers of America).
2. See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of NASA's plans in
space.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2451(c) (Supp. IV 1986) provides: "The Congress declares that the gen-
eral welfare of the United States requires that the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion ... seek and encourage, to the maximum extent possible, the fullest commercial use of
space."
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space exploration and settlement. This Note will focus primarily on the
United States settlement in space and its implications for a legal system
there.
The federal government's authority over space settlement can be
analogized to its authority over treaty matters,4 federal property and ter-
ritory,5 interstate and foreign commerce,6 national defense,7 and the high
seas.' These constitutional powers permit the federal government to pro-
tect national security and the United States interest in improving life on
Earth.
This Note discusses the constitutional implications of American set-
tlement in space. Part I discusses the benefits of space exploration and
settlement, current regulation of space activities, and the probable char-
acterization of an American space settlement. Part II examines the ter-
ritorial expansion which has led the United States to exploration and
potential settlement beyond the Earth's atmosphere. Part III then con-
siders and analyzes constitutional grants of power which would permit
Congress to design a governing order in space. It also considers alterna-
tive judicial systems for meeting the unique needs of a space community.
Part IV discusses the negative implications of state regulation of space
activity and its interference with federal interests in the area. Part V sets
forth a model which analogizes the space station to a federal territory,
and proposes that Congress enact a Federal Space Code to govern space
activities and establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over claims arising
under that Code. This Note concludes that exclusive federal control over
space development is crucial for the protection and enforcement of fed-
eral interests in the area.
I. Space Exploration and Settlement
A. The Benefits of Exploring Space
Years of research have revealed the potential benefits of activity in
space. In recent years, nations have viewed space as a new frontier,9 in
part to provide relief for problems found on Earth, such as overpopula-
tion and scarcity of resources. Since many of the resources located and
used on Earth are also found in space, exploration and development of
space promises rich rewards for humankind.
4. See infra notes 99-120 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 121-146 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 147-156 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 157-167 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 168-176 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, entered into force
Oct. 10, 1967, preamble, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter The
Outer Space Treaty].
The microgravity atmosphere of space can enhance productivity and
efficiency in the manufacturing of goods, permitting results which are
presently unattainable on Earth."° For example, a recent experiment
demonstrated the possibility of producing "more than 700 times the ma-
terial that could be extracted from similar Earth-based processing, with a
fourfold increase in purity[,] . . . enabl[ing] production of advanced
pharmaceuticals for more effective treatment of many diseases."11 These
improvements could signify better and less expensive consumer products.
Technology originally developed for NASA's space program has al-
ready provided new products and processes on Earth. These secondary
applications include breathing systems for firefighters,"2 the production
of a fire resistant textile ingredient,13 computer software programs which
provide industries with important data resources, 14 energy systems de-
sign programs, 15 remote sensing systems, 6 and even a new line of ath-
letic shoes."' Thus, the result of space research has been to improve life
on Earth, even before space settlement has been achieved.
B. Plans for Space Settlement
Over the next fifty years,' 8 the United States government hopes to
implement the following plans: construction of a "low cost Earth-to-or-
bit cargo vehicle and a companion passenger craft,"' 19 a space station,20 a
full-scale lunar manufacturing facility,2 and a Mars spaceport.22
NASA's transportation vehicles will be used to carry people and material
10. See NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, SPINOFF 1986, at 42
[hereinafter SPINOFF].
11. Id. at 44. See id. for details on the capability of splitting matter for pharmaceutical
purposes.
12. Id. at 50-53.
13. Id. at 54-56.
14. Id. at 72.
15. Id. at 79.
16. Id. at 110.
17. Id. at 84.
18. Id. at 33.
19. Id. at 32.
20. Id. The United States has signed agreements with Japan, Canada, and the European
Space Agency (ESA) member nations, see infra note 34, to cooperate in developing the space
station. SPINOFF, supra note 10, at 36. Each sovereign is responsible for designing a differ-
ent aspect of the station. Id. Japan is contemplating a multipurpose research and develop-
ment laboratory. Id. Canada is developing a Mobile Servicing Center, improving Canada's
knowledge of the shuttle orbiter's robot manipulator arm. Id. ESA is studying designs for
unmanned platforms which could be used as a laboratory "with facilities for materials process-
ing and life sciences experimentation." Id.
Although the nations are cooperating in constructing a space station, each will exercise
authority over distinct modules comprising the station. See id. at 40. The station should be
operational by 1994. Id. at 32.
21. SPINOFF, supra note 10, at 32.
22. Id. at 33.
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into space to help build space facilities. Later, as products are manufac-
tured in space, the vehicles will be used to transport these products from
space to Earth. A space station, operating at an altitude of about 300
miles from Earth, will house laboratories, factories, residential areas,
governmental offices, 3 and a military complex to protect the station as
well as American interests on Earth.24 The space station wil serve as an
important assembly and service depot as well as a base for travel in
space." The full lunar spaceport will permit the exploration and ex-
ploitation of lunar resources for production and consumption on Earth
as well as in space.26 The Mars spaceport will serve the same purpose as
the lunar spaceport, and should be constructed by the year 2030.27
Since space settlement will occur in several stages, many of which
have not yet advanced beyond their initial conception, it is impossible to
foresee at this moment all the different methods for settling in space.
Recognizing that a distinct set of implications will accompany each
method of settling, this Note focuses on the implications associated with
the construction and settlement of the following American space station.
The space station initially will have eight crew members, each serv-
ing for periods of approximately three months.2 8 Over the ensuing de-
cades, new modules will be added to the initial modules,29 each module
providing distinct services, so that the station will become a full-service
depot for those travelling between Earth and the lunar and Martian
spaceports. When the station becomes more functional and the services
more varied, people will be able to reside there for longer periods of time.
As the duration of the community members' stay lengthens, it will be-
come increasingly necessary to develop a means for regulating those ac-
tivities occurring in space.
C. Regulation of Space Activities
The benefits and opportunities provided by space exploration have
made international and national legislation regarding space activities in-
creasingly important.3" Even before launching rockets into space, na-
tions negotiated and entered into treaties to regulate activity in space"1 to
23. Id. at 34-35, 40.
24. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
25. SPINOFF, supra note 10, at 35.
26. Id. at 32-33.
27. Id. at 33.
28. Id. at 41.
29. NASA currently plans to place two to four modules in space; the exact number will be
determined at a later date. Id. at 40.
30. See infra notes 31 & 51.
31. See, e.g., The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9 (setting forth the foundation for all
space activity); Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
entered into force Sept. 1, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [herein-
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ensure global peace and to protect non-"space-competent" nations32
from falling prey to "space-competent" nations, such as the United
States and the Soviet Union. Under the space treaties, national govern-
ments33 and intergovernmental agencies34 retain broad authority over
space development and have exclusive control over all space activities,
including the launching and placement of satellites in space.35
An analysis of the manner in which nations have regulated other
areas similar to space is important to an understanding of how the inter-
national community has approached space activities and how it will ap-
proach future development in space. Treaties and customary
international law limit the acquisition of new territories. 36 Treaties also
regulate the use and exploitation of the territories governed. Two inter-
national treaties regulating transnational areas-the High Seas Conven-
tion37  and the Antarctic Treaty38-provide particularly useful
after The Liability Convention] (establishing rules for determining liability for damage arising
from space activity).
32. By "space-competent" nations, the author means those nations involved in space re-
search and those that have already achieved the means to travel in space.
33. For example, countries such as the United States, the Soviet Union, and France have
been most visible in financing the space research and voyages that have occurred thus far.
34. Some countries have pooled resources to compete in space against the United States
and the Soviet Union. These joint ventures consist of public intergovernmental agencies such
as the European Space Agency (ESA), which is comprised of some of the member nations of
the Common Market. ESA, originally and officially named "The European Space Research
Organisation" was initiated by treaty. Agreement Between the Governments of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland Setting
up a Preparatory Commission to Study the Possibilities of European Collaboration in the Field
of Space Research, entered into force Feb. 27, 1961, 414 U.N.T.S. 109. This Organization was
effectively established by the Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Research
Organisation, entered into force March 20, 1964, 528 U.N.T.S. 33. Somewhere along the way,
the European Space Research Organisation has become popularly known as the European
Space Agency.
35. For instance, several nations joined to establish the International Telecommunications
Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT), an intergovernmental organization in charge of regulating
and monitoring the placement and use of satellites in orbit. Agreement Relating to the Inter-
national Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), entered into force Feb. 12,
1973, 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 (pursuant to Agreement Establishing Interim Ar-
rangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System, entered into force
Aug. 20, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1705, T.I.A.S. No. 5646, 514 U.N.T.S. 25). To enforce the agree-
ment on its part, the United States government created the Communications Satellite Corpora-
tion (COMSAT) which regulates and monitors all satellite activity by the United States. See
Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744 (1982). The President of the
United States appoints COMSAT's board of directors. Id. § 733(a).
36. See generally J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1979).
37. Convention on the High Seas, entered into force Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2313,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter The High Seas Convention].
38. The Antarctic Treaty, entered into force June 23, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No.
4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter The Antarctic Treaty].
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comparisons to treaties governing space. The High Seas Convention reg-
ulates access to the "high seas,"3 9 and prevents nations from establishing
control over international waters or interfering with the trade between
other nations." The Antarctic Treaty regulates the exploration and ex-
ploitation of Antarctic resources.41 It provides that Antarctica be used
for peaceful purposes only,42 and that the territory not be subject to any
new claims or the enlargement of pre-existing claims.43 The Treaty is
designed to encourage countries to explore cooperatively Antarctic re-
sources without excluding other nations.'
Space may be analogized to the high seas and to Antarctica. Like
those areas, space has resources of benefit to all nations, and thus should
be open to all nations equally. If these transnational areas did not remain
open, the global powers could dominate them. Space treaties guarantee
peaceful exploration of space-' and prevent. space colonialization.46
Space treaties also contain many of the same provisions as the High Seas
Convention and the Antarctic Treaty.47 Since each treaty concerns a
transnational area that nations hope will remain open, the language used
in these treaties is understandably similar.4"
According to international law, the United States may regulate
space activity as long as it does not interfere with other nations' access
to, or equal enjoyment of, the area. In 1958, the United States estab-
lished a space program in an effort to maintain its technological superior-
39. "The Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating shall estab-
lish appropriate identifiable demarcation lines dividing the high seas from harbors, rivers, and
other inland waters of the United States... ." 33 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1982). The lines of demar-
cation are further described at 33 C.F.R. §§ 80.01-80.1705 (1986). "These lines may not be
located more than twelve nautical miles seaward of the base line from which the territorial sea
is measured." 33 U.S.C. § 151(b) (1983). The high seas encompass the portion of the oceans
which is outside of any nation's territorial boundaries.
40. The High Seas Convention, supra note 37, arts. 2-4.
41. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 38.
42. Id. preamble & art. 1.
43. Id. art. IV.
44. Id. art. III, cl. 2.
45. The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. IV.
46. Id. art. II.
47. Compare id. art. I with The High Seas Convention, supra note 37, art. 3 (all nations
should have free access to enjoy these areas); The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. II with
The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 38, art. IV (claims of national sovereignty prohibited); The
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. I with The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 38 art. III
(international cooperation for scientific research encouraged); The Outer Space Treaty, supra
note 9, art. IV with the Antarctic Treaty, supra note 38, art. I (nonpeaceful use of area
prohibited).
48. See, e.g., The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. I ("The exploration and use of
outer space ... shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries... and
shall be the province of all mankind."); The High Seas Convention, supra note 37, art. 2 ("The
high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to
its sovereignty.").
ity and to explore space technology and science as well as the potential
application of new space technology both on Earth and in space.49 Since
the benefits from scientific discoveries in this field have a dramatic effect
on both the military and civilian sectors,5" the federal government dele-
gated authority over space research to both sectors.51
In accordance with precepts of international law, the United States
will have authority over the American space station itself, but the area
surrounding the station will remain open to all other nations.52 As the
situation now appears, the authority to regulate activities occurring in-
side the space station is left open to the federal, state, and local govern-
ments. Inside the space station, private industries will work alongside
public enterprises in conducting research and manufacturing goods. On
Earth, federal, state, and local governments regulate the same types of
activities that will occur in space.53 Therefore, a conflict arises over
which level of government will regulate the activities occurring inside the
space station.
II. United States Territorial Expansion
Technology and migration have enabled the United States to expand
its territory throughout its history.54 In entering new regions, the United
States has derived several different approaches to the governance of for-
49. One of the United States objectives for establishing a space program is "[t]he preserva-
tion of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technol-
ogy and in the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the
atmosphere." 42 U.S.C. § 2451(d)(5) (Supp. III 1985).
50, See, eg., infra notes 161-163 and accompanying text (military applications); supra
notes 10-17 and accompanying text (commercial benefits).
51. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-2477 (1982). The
statute reads in pertinent part:
[Space] activities shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, a civilian
agency exercising control over aeronautical and space activities sponsored by the
United States, except that activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the de-
velopment of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United
States (including the research and development necessary to make effective provision
for the defense of the United States) shall be the responsibility of, and shall be di-
rected by, the Department of Defense ....
Id. § 2451(b). Both NASA and the Department of Defense have authority over space activi-
ties and related research.
52. See infra notes 208-213 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 254-257 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the federal and
state governments allocate the authority to regulate those activities on Earth.
54. In Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), disapproved on other grounds
sub nom. Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353, 361 (1984), Chief Justice Stone
described the constitutional authority to expand the United States territory:
[T]he United States may acquire territory by conquest or by treaty, and may govern
it through the exercise of the power of Congress conferred by § 3 of Article IV of the
Constitution "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."
Id. at 673-74. See supra note 36 and infra notes 121-146 and accompanying text.
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eign lands and people. These approaches may provide a framework for
addressing similar issues when the United States explores and settles in
space.
A. Continental Territories
During the nineteenth century, American pioneers travelled west-
ward. Indian tribes resisted the pioneers' assertion of rule over the
land;5 however, the federal government endorsed the pioneers' actions
and helped them establish settlements wherever possible.5 6
Although the governing order of the territories resembled that of the
states, the federal government participated more substantially in territo-
rial affairs. The federal government appointed a governor, a secretary,
and three judges to govern each territory.57 The white adult male popu-
lation in the territory elected representatives to a territorial legislature
and one delegate to represent the territory's interest in Congress. 8
Although the delegates participated in congressional debates, they
could not vote. 9 Nevertheless, because they were viewed as experts on
territorial issues, the territorial delegates were influential in Congress.6"
They lobbied on behalf of their territories, helping them to achieve state-
hood.6" Upon reaching statehood, the former territories held intact a
political order resembling that of the other states, except for the enact-
ment of state constitutions.
B. An Insular Territorial Model: Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii,
and the Philippines
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the United States began
to look beyond its continental boundaries to Cuba, Central America, and
the Pacific as places to which it could extend its influence. In the Span-
55. S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 445 (1965).
56. By a policy of removal, the federal government exchanged land in the western territo-
ries for Indian land in the eastern states. Id. at 445-46. States often initiated the removal by
asserting jurisdiction over Indian reservations, despite the violation of federal treaties with the
Indians. Id. The federal government then appropriated funds to compensate the Indians for
their land and to permit them to purchase new land in the western territories. Id.
57. E. POMEROY, THE TERRITORIES AND THE UNITED STATES, 1861-1890, at 51, 98
(1969).
58. Id. at 80. Tension existed between the federal and territorial governments. Id. at 100-
06. The popularly elected territorial legislature could block the power of the federally ap-
pointed governor, who oftentimes came from outside the territory and knew little about the
local population's concerns. Id. at 101. The people mistrusted the federally appointed officers
who received salaries from sources outside of the territories. Id. The appointed officials, how-
ever, tried to cater to the population's interests because they oftentimes wanted to be elected by
the people to return to the East as a territorial delegate to Congress. Id. at 98.
59. Id. at 80.
60. Id. at 82-89.
61. Id.
ish-American War, the United States captured Cuba, Puerto Rico, and
the Philippines from Spain, and annexed the islands of Hawaii.
62
The United States had to decide how to govern each newly acquired
territory, and provided each with a different treatment.63 The United
States did not annex Cuba; instead, the United States Army occupied the
island for three years until Cuba had a constitutional convention in
which Cuba declared its sovereignty.64
In Puerto Rico, the existing system of law and local government was
not as well organized as in Cuba, and the United States faced less resist-
ance to its rule. 6' The government established in Puerto Rico resembled
that of the continental territories: the United States appointed the gover-
nor, the Puerto Rican Supreme Court justices, and certain members of
the executive council, 66 while the Puerto Rican citizens elected their as-
sembly.67 The Organic Act of 191768 granted American citizenship to
Puerto Ricans, 69 and promised steady progress toward Puerto Rican self-
government.70 Today, Puerto Rico is a commonwealth, with an elected
governor.7'
By a congressional joint resolution in 1898,72 the United States an-
nexed the islands of Hawaii. In the Organic Act of 1900,71 the United
States conferred American citizenship on the Hawaiian people,74 and the
full status of a territory, eligible for statehood, on the islands of Hawaii.75
In the Philippines, as in Puerto Rico, the United States governed
through its War Department; it did not have a colonial office nor did it
appoint a secretary.76 The Philippine insular government also resembled
that of the continental territories77 until its independence in 1946.
62. S. MORISON, supra note 55, at 804-07.
63. See infra notes 121-132 and accompanying text for a discussion of congressional au-
thority over territories.
64. S. MORISON, supra note 55, at 808.
65. Id.
66. Organic Act of 1917, ch. 145, §§ 12, 13, 39 Stat. 951 (the President appoints the
attorney general and the commissioner of education, by and with the advice and consent of the
United States Senate). See also S. MORIsoN, supra note 55, at 808.
67. Organic Act of 1917, supra note 66, §§ 26, 27.
68. 39 Stat. 951.
69. Id. § 5.
70. See S. MORISON, supra note 55, at 809.
71. Id. Puerto Rico may elect to become a state of the United States.
72. Res. 55, 30 Stat. 750 (1898).
73. Ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141 (1900).
74. Id. § 4.
75. On August 21, 1959, the State of Hawaii was admitted into the Union. See Act of
March 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (1959), for the proclamation of Hawaii's accept-
ance into the Union.
76. See S. MORISON, supra note 55, at 806.
77. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
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C. A Trust Model: The Pacific Islands
After World War II, the United States became responsible for the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands78 through the United Nations' in-
ternational trusteeship system.79 The United States was to help rebuild
the islands after the war and to lay a foundation for eventual indepen-
dence. Under the trusteeship agreement,80 the United States has "full
powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory
... and may apply to the Trust Territory... such of the laws of the
United States as it may deem appropriate to local conditions and
requirements. 8 1
The trust model grants to the trust territory greater sovereignty than
that enjoyed by the older insular territories. To illustrate, in the early
1970's the United States entered negotiations with trust territory repre-
sentatives in the Northern Mariana Islands, which were altering their ties
with the other Micronesian islands, 2 to reach a mutually desirable agree-
78. S.C. Res. 21 (1947), cited in J. CRAWFORD, supra note 36, app. at 428. This territory
encompasses Micronesia. The United States inherited the trusteeship from Japan, which the
United States argued had "forfeited the right and capacity to be the mandatory Power over
these islands" because of its military use of the islands during World War II. J. CRAWFORD,
supra note 36, at 347 (U.N. Security Council, SCOR 133d mtg., Feb. 26, 1947, at 413) (re-
marks of United States Representative Austin). In its instrument of surrender, Japan accepted
the transfer of responsibility to the victors, and renounced all rights to the islands. Id at 348.
See also Treaty of Peace of September 8, 1951, Art. 2, 136 U.N.T.S. 45, 48-51.
79. See J. CRAWFORD, supra note 36, at 335 (Chapters XII and XIII of the U.N. Charter
provide the legal basis for the International Trusteeship System).
80. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, entered into force
July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 189 [hereinafter Trusteeship
Agreement].
81. Id. art. III.
82. See P. LEARY, THE NORTHERN MARIANAS COVENANT AND AMERICAN TERRITO-
RIAL RELATIONS 5-11 (1980). The trust territory was transformed into four separate political
entities: the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, the Republic of the Marshall Islands,
the Federated State of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau. Hills, Compact of Free Associa-
tion for Micronesia: Constitutional and International Law Issues, 18 INT'L LAW. 583, 583
(1984). In 1975, the people of the Northern Marianas approved a covenant with the United
States under which it will become a United States commonwealth upon termination of the
trusteeship. Id. The United States is waiting for all four entities to qualify for sovereignty
before terminating its responsibilities. The people of the other three political entities have
approved a "free association" political status with the United States, but have not yet per-
formed all the necessary tasks to qualify for termination of the trusteeship. Id.
Free association denomination is one of three ways to terminate non-self-governing status,
a status enjoyed by the four entities under the international trusteeship system. Id. at 602.
The other two ways are emergence as an independent state, and incorporation into an in-
dependent state. Id.
Under the Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770
(1985), these entities enjoy full authority to conduct their own internal and foreign affairs.
However, the United States retains "full authority and responsibility for security and defense
matters." Id. § 311.
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ment-The Northern Marianas Covenant.8 3 This agreement granted the
islands greater sovereignty than that enjoyed by Puerto Rico, Guam,
American Samoa, and other United States territories.8 4 The United
States agreed to help the people of the Islands draft their own constitu-
tion"5 in accordance with the principles of the Federal Constitution. The
United States also agreed to limit federal authority over the internal af-
fairs of the islands.
8 6
D. An Analysis of the Three Territorial Models
The development of three distinct United States territorial methods
is largely attributable to the history and customs of the various territo-
ries. The continental territories shared some of the same customs and
history of the rest of the United States. Thus, in the continental territo-
rial model, Congress planned to incorporate the territories into the
United States by eventually granting them the status of statehood, with
all accompanying rights and privileges.8 7 Under the insular territorial
model, Congress did not consider the territories for incorporation into
the United States 8 because the people of these territories enjoyed distinct
customs and spoke different languages. 9 For this reason, it was often-
times necessary for Congress to provide territorial laws that conformed
to the needs and customs of the territorial citizens.9" Although Congress
permitted the insular territories some latitude in designing a governing
order to accommodate the territorial lifestyle, Congress still limited terri-
torial sovereignty.91 Finally, in the trust model, the territories followed
83. Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political
Union with the United States of America, Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263 (1976) [hereinafter
Northern Marianas Covenant].
84. P. LEARY, supra note 82, at 20, 21.
85. Northern Marianas Covenant, supra note 83, art. I, § 103, & art. II.
86. Id. art. I, §§ 103, 105. The effect of the Covenant, the Northern Marianas argued,
would be to make the Islands more state-like than the other territories. P. LEARY, supra note
82, at 21, 22. However, the United States took another view of the agreement-possibly to
quell the anxiety of the other territories-stating that, although the Islands drafted their own
constitution, the United States retained the authority to supersede any laws enacted by the
Northern Marianas. Id. at 23, 25. As the supreme law of the land, federal law could still
preempt the Islands' regulations. Id. See also infra notes 255-257 and accompanying text.
Any congressional resolution to limit federal authority on the Islands could always be revoked
by Congress at a later date. P. LEARY, supra note 82, at 25.
87. E. POMEROY, supra note 57, at 2, 4.
88. Id.
89. In 1980, nearly 100% of the Puerto Rican population was Hispanic, and approxi-
mately 42% of the Guamanian population was ethnically called Chamorros and spoke the
native Chamorro in addition to English. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1987,
at 669.
90. See infra notes 125-128.
91. See, e.g., Organic Act of 1917, supra note 66, § 57 (recognizing congressional power
to alter, amend, modify, or repeal "any law or ordinance, civil or criminal.... as it may from
time to time see fit [for Puerto Rico]").
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an entirely different path. Since the initial purpose for the trusteeship
was assistance towards self-government, 92 the United States was more
willing to deviate from its continental standards, granting the trust gov-
ernments greater sovereignty over internal matters.
When, and if, Congress classifies the space community as a territory,
Congress must examine the three territorial models93 to determine which
model, or models, would be the most appropriate basis for the space
community's political structure. The space community's future status
may determine Congress' choice of a territorial model. If Congress con-
siders the community an incorporated territory, later to become one of
the several states of the Union, Congress may wish to follow the conti-
nental territorial model. 94 However, if Congress intends the space com-
munity to remain a United States dependency, the insular territorial
model may prove a more reasonable route.95 Finally, the trust model
would allow Congress to assist the space community in its initial stages,
and eventually to grant the community greater sovereignty over its inter-
nal affairs.96 Each of these models would permit Congress to consider
the characteristics of a space community in designing a governing order,
although these models may not be able to accomodate the community's
unique characteristics. Instead, an entirely new territorial structure may
be required.
III. Congressional Authority to Design a Governing Order
Several constitutional grants of power are helpful in ascertaining
congressional authority to design a legal order in space. This authority
depends on the nature and purpose of the territory. The nature of a
space community is transnational; the purpose is peaceful exploration
and exploitation of space resources.97 In laying a foundation for a pros-
perous space community, both legislative and judicial functions will be
crucial: Congress must have the authority to enact laws to regulate space
settlement, and the judiciary will be needed to interpret these laws in the
event of disputes. Congress and the judiciary will also require the au-
thority to use alternative dispute resolution procedures in space to mini-
mize the potential ill effects that formal litigation could have upon a
volatile environment like a space station.
A. Legislative Authority
Congressional authority to regulate particular activities is derived
92. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 55-92.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 62-77.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 78-86.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 45, 48 & infra note 171.
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from the Constitution.9" Discussed below are five grants of constitutional
power which allow Congress to regulate space activities: the power to
implement treaties, to regulate federal territories and property, to regu-
late interstate and foreign commerce, to maintain national defense, and
to define crimes on the high seas. This Note also discusses how each
grant of authority is useful in ascertaining Congress' plenary power to
design a legal order for the space settlement.
1. Treaty Power
Article II, section 2 of the Constitution states that "[the Executive]
shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur
... ."9 Article I, section 10 of the Constitution provides that "[n]o State
shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation . . . ."'I The
federal government thus has the exclusive power to enter into treaties. 101
When ratified, these treaties supersede inconsistent state laws 0 2 by virtue
of the Supremacy Clause.10 3
Congress' role in regard to treaties depends on whether or not the
treaty is "self-executing." 1" If the treaty is considered self-executing,
the Senate may simply ratify the treaty to incorporate it into the laws of
the United States.105 If the treaty is not deemed self-executing, 1 6 Con-
gress must enact implementing legislation to make the treaty enforcea-
ble. 107 In both cases, however, Congress is responsible for promulgating
98. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-79 (1803); see also J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 111 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter J. NowAK].
99. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
100. U.S. CONT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
101. See the Supreme Court's discussion of exclusive federal power over treaties in Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941).
102. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942).
103. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
104. A self-executing treaty does not require Congress to enact legislation before it be-
comes effective. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S.
831 (1979). The subject of the treaty is usually adequately covered in the treaty to enable all
three branches of government to enforce it. Thus, enforcement can occur without prior "gov-
ernmental action that under the Constitution can be taken only by Congress." Id. at 877.
Upon ratification by the Senate, the treaty is incorporated into the laws of the United States.
Westar Marine Serv. v. Heerema Marine Contractors, 621 F. Supp. 1135, 1137 (N.D. Cal.
1985). The American Law Institute suggests that self-executing treaties are effective as the
domestic law of the United States and supersede inconsistent provisions of earlier federal or
state laws. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 141 (1981).
105. See Westar Marine Sery., 621 F. Supp. at 1137.
106. Whether a treaty is self-executing is "a matter of interpretation to be determined by
the courts... [by looking] to the intent of the signatory parties as manifested by the language
of the instrument, and, if the instrument is uncertain, recourse must be had to the circum-
stances surrounding its execution." Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
107. See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985);
Hopson v. Kreps, 622 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980). A non-self-executing treaty "affords a
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laws consistent with the treaties. ' ° s
The United States has entered into four treaties which regulate
space activities: the "Outer Space Treaty,"' 9 the Agreement on the Res-
cue of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space,"' the "Liability Convention,""' and the "Registration Coven-
tion".112 These treaties are not self-executing where they require con-
gressional legislation before having full effect.11 Where these treaties are
not self-executing, Congress can classify its space legislation as necessary
to implement them. Until Congress enacts the necessary space legisla-
tion, these treaties may not be fully enforceable and may not act as a
source of congressional authority in space.'
14
Congressional authority to regulate space activity under the Treaty
Clause might also depend on whether Congress classifies the space sta-
tion as a territory or as personal property.' 5 Under the Outer Space
Treaty, a nation cannot claim sovereignty in space;"16 thus, the United
States would violate the Treaty if it mapped out a territorial area subject
to its sovereignty. Yet, pursuant to the same Treaty, a nation has juris-
diction and control over its space objects and personnel.117 The Treaty's
two provisions can be read consistently to allow a nation to retain control
over the activities occurring inside of its space object so long as it does
not interfere with other nations' use of outer space."' It therefore would
be more practical to define congressional authority in terms of the space
objects and everything, including persons, relating to those objects, thus
giving Congress the power necessary to govern properly American activ-
ity in space.
constitutional basis for an act of Congress superseding inconsistent provisions of the laws of
the several states." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 104,
§ 141(2)(b).
108. See Neely v. Henkel (No. 1), 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901).
109. The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
110. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, entered into force Dec. 3, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S.
No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119.
111. The Liability Convention, supra note 31.
112. Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, entered into force Sept. 15, 1976,
28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter The Registration
Convention].
113. See, e.g., The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. VIII ("A State Party to the
Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction
and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a
celestial body."); Note, Dispute Resolution in Space, 7 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 211,
215 (1983).
114. See supra note 107.
115. See infra notes 116-118 & 131-132 and accompanying text.
116. The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. II.
117. Id. art. VIII.
118. See Smith, Lopatkiewicz & Rothblatt, Legal Implications of a Permanent Manned
Presence in Space, 85 W. VA. L. REv. 857, 862-63 (1983).
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By enacting legislation consistent with the Outer Space Treaty, Con-
gress could regulate space activities and prevent the violation of provi-
sions of other space treaties. For example, under the Liability
Convention, a nation is internationally liable for any damage caused by
its space objects. '19 Thus, the United States has a strong interest in mon-
itoring all space objects "launched" by both the public and private
sectors.
Once a treaty becomes effective, the federal government may allo-
cate the enforcement power within its domestic constitutional order."12
Thus, the federal government may delegate authority among the several
states, or likewise, it may decide to retain all authority if necessary to
ensure enforcement of the treaty.
2. Territorial and Proprietary Authority
The Territory and Property Clause of the Constitution permits Con-
gress to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Terri-
tory or other Property belonging to the United States."'' Under its
territorial authority, Congress has plenary power to govern and legislate
for territories of the United States, and to establish territorial govern-
ments.122 Under its proprietary authority, Congress may make all laws
necessary to regulate property belonging to the United States.
123
a. Territorial Authority
Congress may delegate to a territorial government all powers neces-
sary to self-governance-legislative, executive, and judicial-provided
Congress retains the right to revise, alter, and revoke territorial deci-
sions. "'24 For each territory, Congress enacts an "organic act" which
serves as a constitution. In promulgating the organic acts for unincorpo-
119. The Liability Convention, supra note 31, art. II. See also The Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 9, arts. II & III.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 104, § 402 comment
h, at 101.
121. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
122. Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 491 (1904). See also 2 C. ANTIEAU, MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 350 (1969):
Congress can do for one of the federal territories, dependencies, or possessions
whatever a state might do for itself or one of its political subdivisions, since over such
dependencies the nation possesses the sovereign powers of the general government
plus the powers of a local or a state government in all cases where legislation is
possible.
123. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F.
Supp. 321, 355 n.49 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
124. C. ANTIEAU, supra note 122, at 350. See also District of Columbia v. John R.
Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109 (1953).
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rated territories12 such as Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands,
Congress has discretion to exclude selective provisions of the Federal
Constitution.126 Certain provisions of the Constitution are deemed "fun-
damental" or "natural", however, and may not be denied to the people of
the territories. 12 7 In determining what is fundamental or natural, Con-
gress may look to the territory's history and customs and tailor a consti-
tutional provision to the territory's cultural needs. 28
The first space community will share many characteristics of a fed-
eral territory. The space community will initially depend on earthside
resources and congressionally dictated means of assistance for survival.
In addition, as citizens spend more time in space, ties to their original
state of domicile will become more attenuated and the citizens will begin
to consider the space community their home. Because of diminished ties
to their state of origin, community members will look to the federal gov-
125. Unincorporated territories are those on which Congress has no intention of conferring
statehood status and which will remain a United States dependency. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 88-91.
126. In Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), disapproved on other grounds
sub nom. Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984), the Supreme Court held
that:
Congress is not subject to the same constitutional limitations, as when it is legislating
for the United States.... And in general the guaranties of the Constitution, save as
they are limitations upon the exercise of executive and legislative power when exerted
for or over our insular possessions, extend to them only as Congress, in the exercise
of its legislative power over territory belonging to the United States, has made those
guaranties applicable.
324 U.S. at 674. See also Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885).
127. Although the Supreme Court has not actually ruled which provisions must apply, in
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,282 (1901), the Court suggested that "there may be a distinc-
tion between certain natural rights enforced in the Constitution by prohibitions against inter-
ference with them, and what may be termed artificial or remedial rights, which are peculiar to
our system of jurisprudence." The provisions which Congress probably could not deny to the
people of the territories would include the First Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. I, and the
Contract and Bill of Attainder Clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, since all of these provi-
sions technically prohibit Congress or the states from passing any law affecting them. Downes,
182 U.S. at 277. Nevertheless, Congress and states have passed laws affecting even these provi-
sions. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980)
(recognizing a state's authority to regulate speech in narrow circumstances); United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1977) (contract clause prohibition not absolute);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 515-17 (1951) (upholding the constitutionality of a
federal statute making it a crime to advocate the overthrow or destruction of the United States
government despite the statute's effect on an individual's first amendment rights); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (right of free exercise of religion is not absolute;
Congress may regulate conduct to protect society).
128. Endleman v. United States, 86 F. 456, 459 (9th Cir. 1898).
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ernment for assistance and guidance in regulating space activity. 129
Thus, as with United States territories, 130 it may be desirable that the
federal government establish a territorial government in space and dele-
gate to it the proper authority to make decisions affecting the space com-
munity. By doing so, Congress would retain ultimate authority over
space activity, and could structure a government to satisfy the needs of
the community members.
Congressional classification of the space community as a territory,
however, might violate the Outer Space Treaty provision prohibiting na-
tions from establishing territories in space."' The United States may
establish a space community under the space treaties, provided that the
United States does not claim exclusive control over an area in space. 132
Therefore, although Congress could analogize the space community to a
territory in establishing a space government and tailoring the govern-
ment's structure to the needs of the space environment, it may be more
prudent to classify the legislation under proprietary authority to avoid
violation of the space treaties.
b. Proprietary Authority
The Supreme Court has interpreted "property" in the Territory and
Property Clause to include all "personal and real property rightfully be-
longing to the United States."1 33 Under this grant of authority, Congress
may dispose of or authorize the use of federal property as it deems neces-
sary, 1 34 and may deny to certain persons the use of federal property if
necessary to protect that property.
1 35
In the American space station, most, if not all, property initially will
be federally owned.136 The federal government has financed most of the
129. In the continental territories, the territorial population relied on federal funding to
assist its progress toward sovereignty. E. POMEROY, supra note 57, at 100. Even though the
population resented, at times, the federal government's power, they still wanted its money. Id.
In space, the community may also rely on federal assistance and yet resent federal inter-
vention. However, until the space community becomes capable of supporting itself, it may
have little choice but to succumb to federal control.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 55-96.
131. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
132. Id.
133. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 331 (1936) (quoting 2 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1325-1326 (5th ed.
1905)).
134. By virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18, Con-
gress would have the proper authority to act accordingly. Cf infra note 155 and accompany-
ing text.
135. C. ArNEAU, supra note 122, at 318.
136. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1984, at Al, col. 3. Other countries, however, will participate
with the United State in constructing the space station. See supra note 20. This discussion is
limited to the financing of the United States share of the station.
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space research and work thus far.137 Although the private sector will
increase its investment in space, the government will likely continue to
finance most of the space station's construction13 s and therefore will be
able to claim a vested proprietary interest in the station. As a property
owner, the federal government may make all laws necessary to regulate
its property, including the regulation of persons handling or affecting its
property. 
139
By contrast, Congress will have limited authority to regulate the
personal property of space community members. 14° In space, as on
Earth, Congress will not be able to deprive an individual of his or her
property without due process of law.' As long as certain procedural
requirements are met, however, the federal government may regulate the
use of space community members' personal property142 if necessary to
protect the government's proprietary interest in the space station and its
equipment.143 Congress may regulate personal matters under its plenary
power to make all laws necessary to uphold the purpose and viability of
the space station, and to prevent damage to federal property.
c. An Analysis of the Territorial and Proprietary Authority and Their
Possible Application in Space
The Territory and Property Clause grants Congress authority to
regulate all activities of a space community, whether that community is
classified as federal territory or property. 144 However, at first-at least
137. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1984, at Al, col. 3.
138. Current space policy encourages private investment in space-related ventures. SPI-
NOFF, supra note 10, at 42. See also supra note 3. However, it appears that this increase in
private investment will be aimed at peripheral space activity and not towards the initial con-
struction of the space station. SPINOFF, supra note 10, at 42-47. Such activity would include
development of new products and methods of production. Id. Thus, although the activity
inside the space station will be increasingly private, the space station itself will still be federally
financed.
139. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
140. Cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-35 (1982)
(the Takings Clause limits governmental restrictions of private property).
141. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
142. Cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). The Mathews Court stated in its
opinion that" '[d]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances .... [D]ue process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Id. (citations omitted); see
also infra notes 222-225 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 134 & infra note 154 and accompanying text.
144. Congressional authority to regulate territory and property under the Constitution is
not diminished because of the existence of a treaty. Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (a
treaty cannot "amend" the Constitution). A treaty cannot therefore restrict Congress' consti-
tutional authority. However, if Congress does enact a statute which is inconsistent with a
treaty, that treaty is void to the extent of the inconsistency. Id. at 18. See Cook v. United
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until the space community consists of more than one module or object-
it may be best to classify the station as property. As the community
grows and becomes more permanent and better equipped to act indepen-
dently, the space community could be reclassified as a territory with all
the characteristics of a territorial government. At that time, it would be
necessary to amend the international space treaties145 to reflect the in-
creased potential for space settlement. Development in space will there-
fore require flexible international and domestic law to deal with concerns
that may have been unforeseeable when the space treaties were
drafted. 146
3. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause147 grants Congress authority to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce. Any state statute constituting an
"unreasonable burden on interstate commerce" may be held unconstitu-
tional. 148 Almost any commercial activity, even if it occurs entirely
within one state, affects interstate commerce. 149 The courts have been
liberal in striking down state statutes and municipal ordinances which
conflict with federal commerce regulations.1
50
Activity occurring in the space station definitely will be of an inter-
state or international character.' 5 ' Products manufactured in the space
factories will be distributed nationally and worldwide. The fact that
transportation will be necessary to travel from Earth to space also sug-
gests that there will be an inherent interstate and international aspect to
States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933); Voorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 575- 76 (4th
Cir. 1983); see also supra text accompanying notes 116-117 & 131-132.
145. The spirit underlying the space treaties permits the launching and placement of ob-
jects in space and on the Moon; however, the treaties prohibit claims of national sovereignty
over an area in space. Under one possible interpretation of the treaties, vehicles or objects
could occupy an area in space so long as occupation did not interfere with other nations' access
to the area surrounding the vehicle or space object. This interpretation is consistent with the
manner in which nations have treated ships sailing on the high seas. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 208-216.
146. See infra note 286.
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.").
148. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 439 (1978).
149. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-
77 (1981); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) ("Even activity that is purely intra-
state in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like con-
duct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign
nations.").
150. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-54 (1985)
(greater federal authority may be permitted because the political process ensures that federal
laws will not unduly burden the states).
151. See March, Authority of the Space Station Commander: The Need for Delegation, 6
GLENDALE L. REv. 73, 84 (1984).
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space activities.'52 Furthermore, people living in the space community1 53
will be from many states and nations; thus, commercial transactions in-
side the station will invoke the Commerce Clause.
Congress will have the constitutional authority via the Commerce
Clause to regulate commercial space activities; however, it is not as clear
whether the Commerce Clause would grant Congress authority to regu-
late or control noncommercial activities. Regulation of both commercial
and noncommercial activities in space may prove imperative to protect
United States commercial interests.'54 Under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 155 Congress may extend its authority to include personal matters
if doing so is necessary to execute its interstate and foreign commerce
regulations. The unique and important nature of the space community's
activity may require Congress to extend its authority over all space
activity.
156
152. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1557 (1982 & Supp. III 1985),
declares that "Et]he United States ... possess[es] and exercise[s] complete and exclusive na-
tional sovereignty in the airspace of the United States .... ." Id. § 1508(a). The Act also
prohibits states from unreasonably burdening and discriminating against interstate commerce
by its regulation of airspace activity. Id. § 1513(d) (Supp. III 1985).
153. As discussed earlier, see supra note 20, initially space station crew members will only
reside in the station for periods of approximately three months. Thus, their ties to Earth will
continue to exist. However, as the space community expands and becomes more permanent,
people will live in space for longer periods of time, and possibly at some point win even be born
in space. See generally Costello, Spacedwelling Families: The Projected Application of Family
Law in Artificial Space Living Environments, 15 SETON HALL L. REv. 11 (1984). When space
community members consider space their domicile, then it may be time to consider the space
community as having state-like or territorial characteristics, capable of giving its members a
new identity. At such time, commercial transactions among space community members would
no longer be interstate or international in nature, but rather intracommunity- intraterritorial
or intrastate.
154. Since everyone at the space station will be involved in some type of work and the
product of that work will be distributed via interstate or foreign commerce, the authority to
regulate the personal lives of the workers may also need to be included within congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause. A problem arising in a worker's personal life might
affect her productivity or lack thereof, thus indirectly affecting interstate commerce and its
continued existence in space. Therefore, congressional authority over both commercial and
personal matters in space may be consistent with the Constitution.
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Congress shall have the power "[tjo make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof."). The Court has given a broad interpretation to the Clause:
By the settled construction and the only reasonable interpretation of this clause, the
words "necessary and proper" are not limited to such measures as are absolutely and
indispensably necessary, without which the powers granted must fail of execution;
but they include all appropriate means which are conducive or adapted to the end to
be accomplished, and which in the judgment of Congress will most advantageously
effect it.
"Legal Tender Case," Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 440 (1884).
156. Even though extension of congressional authority may appear far-reaching, the nature
and significance of the space community's activity may require this result. The space station
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4. National Defense
The Constitution grants national defense authority to the federal
government. 57 Congress has the power to declare war and to raise and
support the armed forces.' 58 Under this grant, congressional authority is
limited to the military aspects of the Nation's foreign policy. Since the
Constitution explicitly restricts the states' power to engage in war and
raise armies, 159 congressional authority over matters concerning national
defense does not infringe upon the rights of the states.1
60
An American presence in space will provide an opportunity for the
federal government to attempt application of many technological and
strategic innovations. The implementation of a program like "Star
Wars"'161 is one possibility. Although the use of offensive arms in space
is expressly prohibited by international treaties,161 the United States con-
tinues to research the possibility of moving the war theater from Earth to
space, arguably as a defensive measure.
Another possible national security measure would involve placing a
module in the space station to house government-controlled reconnais-
sance operations.'63 From this module, the United States could use re-
mote sensing devices to monitor activity occurring on Earth so that the
will be a critical depot for serving the lunar and Martian spaceports and commercial interests
as well as for defending the United States and its interests both on Earth and in space. More-
over, because of the limited resources initially attainable in space, there will not be the same
potential for substituting means to accomplish a goal as there is on Earth thereby making it
more imperative to regulate those means to ensure maximum utility.
157. See infra notes 158-160, and accompanying text.
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16. This authority is parallel to that held by the Presi-
dent of the United States over foreign affairs. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Presi-
dent shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.").
159. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 provides:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ... keep Troops, or Ships of War in
* -time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Dan-
ger as will not admit of delay.
160. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."). This principle of federalism concerns the balance of power between the federal and
state governments and protects state sovereignty from unnecessary federal interference. See
generally, Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, in AMERI-
CAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 85 (L. Friedman & H. Scheiber eds. 1978).
161. "Star Wars" is the popular name for the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense
Initiative proposal. This proposal advocates the placement of a defense shield in space to pre-
vent a nuclear attack on the United States.
* 162. See, eg., The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. IV; Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, entered into force Oct. 10,
1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43; see also supra note 47.
163. The defense module will maximize the strategic advantages of its space location from
which the United States could store arms to be used in defense of American interests on Earth
as well as in space. With the use of reconnaissance devices and satellites, the module would be
S13ring 19871 SPACE SETTLEMENT
736 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 14:715
United States could receive advance warning of a military attack. Like
"Star Wars", this proposal would not violate any treaty as long as it
involved a purely defensive use of military resources.
Congressional authority over national defense may also give Con-
gress broad power to enact different legal standards for space. On Earth,
the federal government has greater authority to regulate the activities of
its military personnel than it has over the activities of civilians. 1 4 If
necessary to protect the Nation, the federal government may subordinate
the civil liberties of its military personnel. 6 ' Accordingly, special civil
and criminal procedures apply to military personnel, especially in time of
war, when national security interests are paramount. 166 If the space sta-
tion and space community members are used for military purposes, Con-
gress may have greater authority to deviate from civilian standards in
order to uphold the interest of national security in space and on Earth. 67
5. The High Seas Analogy
The Constitution grants Congress the authority "to define and pun-
ish... Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the
Law of Nations."' 68 This provision reflects the Framers' intent that the
federal government have primary authority to define and punish crimes
in transnational areas such as the high seas.'
69
Congress has acknowledged an analogy between admiralty and
able to monitor activities on Earth, including those occurring in other nations. See Smith,
Lopatkiewicz & Rothblatt, supra note 118, at 865-67.
164. The Constitution gives Congress power to "make Rules for the Government and Reg-
ulation of the land and naval Forces." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. In exercising this
authority, Congress has promulgated the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-
940 (1982), which regulates conduct on military bases and installations.
165. Congress is still subject to constitutional limitations when exercising its war powers.
C. ANTIEAU, supra note 122, at 326. Congress may not deprive individuals of their fundamen-
tal liberties, particularly those included in the Bill of Rights, merely because of war powers.
Id. However, in times of war, the Supreme Court has been more willing to overlook congres-
sional deprivation of fundamental liberties. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944) (upholding World War II internment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry).
166. The Uniform Code of Military Justice applies to military personnel. 10 U.S.C.
§ 802(a) (1982). Under this Code, military personnel may be court-martialled and sentenced
for crimes which do not apply to civilians and are defined under the Code at sections 877 to
934.
167. By virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, Congress
may enact laws necessary to execute its authority under article I, section 8, clauses 11-16 of the
Constitution. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
169. Cf United States v. Adjona, 120 U.S. 479, 487 (1887) (congressional authority to de-
fine and punish offenses against the "Law of Nations" does not prevent a state from enacting
laws to punish the same act when it may be an offense against the state's authority as well as
that of the United States).
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space law by extending maritime criminal jurisdiction into space.1 70 In
doing so, Congress recognizes that both space and the high seas are con-
sidered transnational, that all nations act on equal footing with respect to
travel through those areas, and that neither area is subject to national
sovereignty, as such dominion would be inconsistent with the area's
transnational nature. 171 By this analogy, Congress also recognizes its au-
thority to "define and punish" felonies committed in space. 172 Giving
Congress, rather than state legislatures, the power to "define and punish"
crimes in space is consistent with the Constitution's grant of power to the
federal government in other areas that concern the United States rela-
tions with other nations, such as foreign affairs,' 73 foreign commerce, 74
and national defense.1
75
At this time, congressional authority under this grant explicitly en-
compasses only criminal offenses. Insurmountable constitutional issues
might arise if Congress attempted to extend its authority under this grant
to include civil matters;176 therefore, Congress will have to rely on other
constitutional grants of power to regulate civil matters.
6. Summary on Legislative Authority
The five bases of constitutional authority are not absolute, although
some convey more power than others. The strongest sources of congres-
sional authority to regulate space activity are found in the provisions
concerning the federal treaty power, the power to regulate territorial and
proprietary interests, and the commerce power. These three powers pro-
vide the basis for asserting a strong federal interest in maintaining and
securing the continued existence of an American space station. Together,
the five constitutional provisions are significant authority for legislation
establishing a space community and regulating space activity. These pro-
visions, taken together, also may be sufficient to extend congressional au-
thority to all space activity.
170. The special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States includes jurisdic-
tion over:
Any vehicle used or designed for flight or navigation in space and on the registry of
the United States pursuant to the [Outer Space Treaty] while that vehicle is in flight,
which is from the moment when all external doors are closed on Earth following
embarkation until the moment when one such door is opened on Earth for disembar-
kation ....
18 U.S.C. § 7(6) (1985).
171. See supra notes 40, 47 & 48 and accompanying text.
172. By extending its authority under article I, section 8, clause 10 of the Constitution,
Congress included space crimes within its power. See 18 U.S.C. § 7(6) (1982).
173. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16.
176. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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B. Judicial Authority
In implementing the federal policy of space settlement, the judiciary
will have the important role of interpreting space regulations and apply-
ing them to situations that were possibly unforeseeable at the time Con-
gress enacted the legislation. Before a federal court may hear a
particular controversy, it must derive its subject matter jurisdiction from
either constitutional 177 or congressional authorization.17  Federal court
jurisdiction may be exclusive or concurrent with that of state courts.
17 9
Whereas concurrent jurisdiction permits state judges to decide issues of
federal law, and thereby exert influence over the development of federal
common law, exclusive federal jurisdiction protects the uniform develop-
ment and application of federal law and can allow for expedient180 and
177. United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984).
178. The Constitution confers original and appellate jurisdiction on federal courts. U.S.
CONsT. art. III, §§ 1-2. In certain circumstances, Congress may regulate the federal courts'
jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. However, in order for a federal court to hear a
controversy, it must derive its authority from either the Constitution or a federal law because
of the federal judiciary's limited jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S.
365, 374 (1978) ("It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are of limited jurisdiction.
The limits upon federal jurisdiction, whether imposed by the constitution or by Congress must
be neither disregarded nor evaded.").
Article III of the Constitution confers Supreme Court jurisdiction over certain defined
matters. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Article III also grants Congress the power to vest judicial
authority in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1. This complements Congress' power, under article I, section 8, clause 9,
"[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."
In Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943), the Court stated that "the Congressional
power to ordain and establish inferior courts includes the power 'of investing them with juris-
diction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in
the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good."'
Id. at 187 (citations omitted) (quoting Justice Daniel in Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236,
245 (1845)).
Congress has exercised its authority to establish federal courts, some of which are special
federal courts, to hear matters exclusive of state courts. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 1338
(1982) (bankruptcy and patent courts); see also infra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
More recently, Congress extended its special maritime and territorial jurisdiction to in-
clude "[a]ny place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or against
a national of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 7(7) (Supp. III 1985). This extension may permit
a federal court to hear controversies arising in space, but not covered by Congress' previous
enactment of space jurisdiction over crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 7(6) (1985); see also infra notes
186-188 and accompanying text.
179. In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). the Court stated that
"[e]oncurrent jurisdiction has been a common phenomenon in our judicial history, and exclu-
sive federal court jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law has been the exception
rather than the rule." Id. at 507-08. The Court would "affirm [concurrent] jurisdiction, where
it is not excluded by express provision, or by incompatibility in its exercise arising from the
nature of the particular case." Id. at 508 (quoting Justice Bradley in Claflen v. Houseman, 93
U.S. 130, 136 (1876)).
180. For example, since the nature of bankruptcy litigation requires speedy adjudication to
relieve the debtor of the threat of foreclosure and the creditors of the possibility of losing their
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expert' 8 ' dispute resolution of space-related conflicts that might not be
possible in state courts.
L Treaties and Federal Questions
The first basis for federal jurisdiction over space controversies is
treaty and federal question jurisdiction. Article III, section 2 of the Con-
stitution confers on the federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving
treaties, as well as those involving federal questions.18 2 Federal courts
may hear any controversy relating to and brought under a federal law or
treaty in which the United States is a party, as long as the federal ques-
tion appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint.18 1 In this regard,
federal jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the states, and in most in-
stances, the plaintiff chooses the forum.'8 4
Judicial interpretation of treaties and of implementing legislation
falls within the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction. 8 s Congress
has made its first attempt to implement the Outer Space Treaty by con-
ferring on the federal courts jurisdiction over criminal offenses commit-
ted in space. 186 According to the statute, federal jurisdiction exists only
over crimes committed inside of "[a]ny vehicle used or designed for flight
or navigation in space .... ,,I7 Whether the statute will apply to crimes
committed in a space station or outside of the space vehicle is still uncer-
tain. To be safe, Congress should amend the statute to extend jurisdic-
tion to crimes committed in space stations and outside of space
vehicles. 188 As more activity occurs in space, Congress will also need to
broaden federal jurisdiction to include civil matters arising in space. Such
]ended assets, Congress set up federal courts handling these matters exclusively. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334 (1982).
181. Certain subjects, such as patent and copyright law, require expert lawyers and judges
to handle the cases so as to facilitate the litigation. For this reason, Congress established a
special federal court handling these matters exclusively. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982).
182. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. l(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
183. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908).
184. The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1983), permits defendants to remove a
civil action from a state court to a federal district court when that district court has original
jurisdiction over the alleged controversy.
185. If a treaty is self-executing, controversies will be viewed as arising from the treaty, and
thus clearly within the federal courts'jurisdiction. Hopson v. Kreps, 622 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th
Cir. 1980). See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text. Even if the treaties are deemed
not self-executing, the implementing legislation enacted by Congress would invoke federal
question jurisdiction if a controversy arose regarding such legislation. Hopson v. Kreps, 622
F.2d at 1380. See also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 159 (1972).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 7(6) (Supp. III 1985). See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
187. 18 U.S.C. § 7(6) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added).
188. The 1984 amendment to the provisions regarding special maritime and territorial ju-
risdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 7(7) (Supp. I1 1985), may cover crimes committed outside of the space
vehicle as long as the crimes affect nationals of the United States. See supra note 178 and
accompanying text.
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an extension would be consistent with the Outer Space Treaty's jurisdic-
tional provision.' 89
Although federal subject matter jurisdiction over treaties and fed-
eral questions is concurrent with that of the states, Congress may decide
to confer exclusive federal jurisdiction over the enforcement of the space
treaties since they are, by nature, extremely important in the realm of
international affairs.' 9 ' In addition, Congress may find it necessary to
require federal jurisdiction over space activity-regardless of whether the
federal question is on the face of a well-pleaded complaint1 91-to ensure
exclusive federal jurisdiction.
2. Diversity of Citizenship
The second basis for federal court jurisdiction over space controver-
sies is diversity of citizenship. Article III, section 2 of the Constitution
confers jurisdiction on federal courts over "[c]ontroversies between two
or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between
citizens of different States, . . . and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." Congress has added to
diversity jurisdiction a $10,000 amount in controversy requirement.
192
The amount in controversy provision reduces the burden on the federal
courts, 193 while reserving an impartial forum for controversies involving
significant stakes.
194
The Framers' intent in including such a jurisdictional vehicle in the
Constitution was to permit people of diverse origins to litigate a contro-
versy in an impartial trial setting rather than compel them to litigate in a
state court subject to local biases.' 1" Since people from many states and
nations, and eventually from different space communities, will live in
space, it is important to provide an impartial forum free from regional
bias. Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction would provide such a forum
and would prevent regional interference with the United States foreign
policy.
189. Article VIII of The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, provides that "[a] State Party to
the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdic-
tion and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a
celestial body."
190. The space treaties protect against a nation's establishment of a space colony which
might threaten the global balance of political and economic power. See, e.g., The Outer Space
Treaty, supra note 9, art. II.
191. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
192. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). The value of the remedy sought must exceed $10,000.
193. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 350-51 (1961).
194. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
195. See Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595, 599 (1856).
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3. Admiralty Analogy
The third basis for federal court jurisdiction in space is provided by
analogy to admiralty law. Federal courts have jurisdiction over admi-
ralty cases. 1 9 6 This jurisdiction sometimes is exclusive,'97 but usually is
concurrent with that of the state courts.198 For a cause of action to lie in
the federal courts, the wrong complained of must occur on navigable
waters' 9 9 and have a sufficient relationship to traditional maritime activi-
ties.2 'o If there is not a sufficient relationship to such activities, then the
party must rely on another jurisdictional vehicle, such as federal ques-
tion 0 1 or diversity of citizenship,2 '2 to have the matter heard in a federal
court.2 °3
The similarities between the conditions on the high seas and those in
space2' make it reasonable to structure space jurisdiction after the pat-
tern of admiralty. Although it is impossible to divine the Framers' intent
regarding space jurisdiction, the analogy to admiralty jurisdiction cur-
rently is controlling.20 5 Congress has extended maritime criminal juris-
diction to include crimes committed in space,206 rather than conferring
space jurisdiction via an independent statute. If Congress' analogy is
constitutionally valid, then Congress may confer space jurisdiction on
196. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982).
197. Federal subject matter jurisdiction over cases of admiralty is exclusive when it per-
tains to in rem proceedings. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1866). See E.
JHIRAD, A. SANN, B. CHASE & M. CHYNSKY, 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 124, at 8-11
(7th ed. 1985) [hereinafter BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY]. In rem proceedings usually concern
controversies regarding the vessel itself, for example, the seaworthiness of the ship.
In rem proceedings are within the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction because such pro-
ceedings were not considered a common-law remedy at the time the Constitution was adopted.
Id. § 124, at 8-13. The saving to suitors clause of the Judiciary Act and of the present proce-
dural statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982), expressly reserves the right to seek common-law reme-
dies in other forums. BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra, § 124, at 8-12, 8-13.
198. States have concurrent jurisdiction by virtue of the "saving to suitors" clause, 28
U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). See supra notes 179 & 197 and accompanying text.
199. In defining "navigable waters," most courts have used the Daniel Ball definition: use
of rivers or other waters as a highway of interstate or foreign commerce. The Daniel Ball, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1871).
200. "[A]n accident between two vessels in navigable waters bears a sufficient relationship
to traditional maritime activity to fall within federal admiralty jurisdiction." Foremost Ins.
Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 669, 674 (1982). According to Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520
(5th Cir. 1973), the factors examined to determine whether there is sufficient "maritime flavor"
include: (I) functions and roles of parties; (2) types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved;
(3) causation and types of injury; and (4) traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law. Id.
at 525.
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). See supra notes 182-191 and accompanying text.
202. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
203. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380-81 (1959).
204. See supra notes 40, 47 & 48 and accompanying text.
205. See 18 U.S.C. § 7(6) (Supp. III 1985). See also supra note 170 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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the federal judiciary, and regulate space jurisdiction as necessary.20 7
The drafters of the space treaties also believed in the analogy, as
shown by their reliance on the High Seas Convention20 8 and customary
international law concerning maritime matters. At sea, jurisdiction is
determined by the flag carried by the ship,2" 9 whereas in space, jurisdic-
tion is determined by the registration of the space object.21 In both cir-
cumstances, jurisdiction lies over the vessel and the people aboard it.21" '
Additionally, jurisdiction carries over to matters arising in the area
around the sea vessel or space object,212 as long as exercise of jurisdiction
is consistent with international law.
2 13
According to international law precepts, no nation may claim na-
tional sovereignty over the sea or space;214 all nations may use these ar-
eas on an equal footing.215 Exercising jurisdiction over space activities
may be viewed as an assertion of dominion or sovereignty over events
occurring in space. Thus, in conferring federal court jurisdiction over
space activities, the United States must be careful not to encroach on
other nations' access to space or on a state's jurisdiction over a contro-
versy. The United States can achieve this by limiting its jurisdiction to
activities having a sufficient relationship with its space objects or
personnel.21 6
C. Alternative Judicial Systems
1. Special Characteristics of a Space Environment
As the human presence in space becomes a reality and people begin
to consider the space community their domicile, adjudication in outer
207. If Congress' analogy is accurate, Congress may use its Article III powers to establish
and ordain inferior courts with jurisdiction over space matters. Cf U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1
& 2, el. 2. See supra notes 155 & 178 and accompanying text for the basis of broad congres-
sional authority to regulate courts. But see generally Comment, The Extension of United
States Criminal Jurisdiction to Outer Space, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 627 (1983).
208. The High Seas Convention, supra note 37, arts. 2-4; Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings
Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 52, 153 (1967) (statement of
Ambassador Arthur Goldberg). See also Cunningham, Space Commerce and Secured Financ-
ing-New Frontiers for the U.C.C., 40 Bus. LAw. 803, 806 n.31 (1985).
209. The High Seas Convention, supra note 37, art. 5.
210. The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. VIII; see also The Registration Convention,
supra note 112.
211. Cf. The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. VIII; The High Seas Convention, supra
note 37, art. 6.
212. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
213. Cf The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. III; The High Seas Convention, supra
note 37.
214. Cf. The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. II; The High Seas Convention, supra
note 37, art. 2.
215. Cf The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. I; The High Seas Convention, supra
note 37, art. 2; see also supra note 171 and accompanying text.
216. See infra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
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space will become necessary. Witnesses, parties to suit, evidence, and a
jury of one's peers will all be located in space, not on Earth. Adjudica-
tion in space will also satisfy the need to resolve disputes quickly to
maintain harmonious space operations.
2 17
At least in the early stages of the space station, the failure to per-
form one's job will cause more serious repercussions than on Earth.
Every person will be in space for a stated purpose and the entire commu-
nity will depend on each individual's performance.21 If a space station
technician becomes sick or refuses to work, another person will need to
replace her. The substitute will probably be forced to perform that job in
addition to her other assigned tasks. Thus, absence from work will bur-
den the rest of the community. This factor, combined with the artificial
atmosphere and physical side effects experienced on a space shuttle or
space station, will likely make the working and living environment
volatile.219
The urgent need that everyone work and the mercurial nature of the
space environment will make expedient adjudication imperative. It will
not be possible to wait for the docket to clear before controversies can be
heard in court. Parties, as well as the entire space station, will need to
resolve disputes quickly to ease tension and to avoid major disruptions in
work schedules.
2. The Types of Disputes Arising in an American Space Station
Several types of disputes will arise in space. The two general types
of claims will be quasi-traditional claims and psychological-personal
claims. The traditional claims made on Earth, concerning contracts,
torts, crimes, and property, will also be made in space. The nature of
these claims, however, may differ from those on Earth because of the
unique characteristics of a space environment. For instance, in many
states on Earth, if someone sees another person in physical danger, there
is no duty of rescue. However, in space, where the station's survival re-
lies on the participation of all community members, a duty to rescue may
be imperative. The failure to rescue, therefore, may be considered a tort
or a crime in space.
217. See Note, Dispute Resolution in Space, supra note 113, at 233; see generally Stiennon,
The Procedural Problems of Administering Criminal Justice in Space, 1 . OF ASTROLAW 1
(1985).
218. Since the initial crew will consist of eight members working in space for three month
periods, SPINOFF, supra note 10, at 41, it seems reasonable to assume that everyone will be
serving an expected function that cannot be ignored.
219. People spending a lot of time in space have suffered both physiological and psycholog-
ical effects. These changes cause the person to feel isolated, confined, stressed, nauseous, and
tired. This general feeling of malaise makes people easily irritable, leading to a greater possib-
lility of intracrew disagreements, For a better description of these effects, see Note, Dispute
Resolution in Space, supra note 113, at 217-20.
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Psychological-personal claims will involve situations which on
Earth would never reach the courts. On Earth, when a member of society
is angry with another member, she must deal with the other member to
resolve the problem, and may not come into court for the judge's assist-
ance unless authority exists for the judge to help in such a situation. In a
volatile space environment, however, an expedient resolution may be
needed to avoid interference with the success of the space station's mis-
sion. Tension between community members could easily destroy the
working environment for everyone, thus affecting the station's produc-
tion. In space, therefore, judges will need to help resolve problems con-
cerning purely psychological or personal matters in order to protect the
station's environment from emotional interference.
3. The Need to Amend Constitutional and Procedural Protections
Court procedures and constitutional protections may have to be al-
tered to conform to the needs of the space environment. This departure
from procedure might be more readily permitted if the space station is
considered property or a territory of the United States than if it is consid-
ered part of the United States proper.220
The courts' primary inquiry in determining whether a judicial pro-
cedure is constitutionally valid under the Due Process Clause22 is
whether the procedure is "fair."2 22  Courts use the Mathews v. El-
dridge223 balancing test to determine the constitutionality of the proce-
dure afforded a party.224 In applying this test, the court considers:
[flirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fis-
cal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.225
Under this test, the denial of the right to a jury trial 226 in space may
220. The Supreme Court has stated that "Congress, in the government of the Territories as
well as of the District of Columbia, has plenary power, save as controlled by the provisions of
the Constitution, that the form of government it shall establish is not prescribed, and may not
necessarily be the same in all the Territories." Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486,491 (1904).
221. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
222. J. NOWAK, supra note 98, at 487.
223. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
224. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754, 758 (1982); Little v. Streater, 452
U.S. 1, 6 (1981); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1978).
225. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
226. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees the defendant the right to a jury
trial in a criminal proceeding. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24,
36 (1965). See infra note 227 for a description of the seventh amendment right to jury trial in
certain civil cases.
[Vol. 14:715
be considered beneficial. First, the station will not have "extra" people
with time to sit through an entire trial. Second, since the space commu-
nity will be relatively small, a jury will not be impartial and likely will
have personal knowledge of the facts. Third, jury trials are inherently
time consuming. This delay is inconsistent with the space station's need
for speedy dispute resolution.
There is precedent for denial of the right to a jury trial in certain
circumstances. In admiralty cases, for example, there is no right to trial
by jury in civil disputes227 because the importance of judicial efficiency
outweighs that of a jury. The need for judicial efficiency is arguably
much greater in space, given the need for speedy resolution of cases. Be-
cause of the additional characteristics of a space community, the admi-
ralty model of jury trial denial should be extended in space to include not
only civil disputes but also trials for crimes of a smaller magnitude,228
since in these proceedings the interest in judicial efficiency 22 9 may still
outweigh that of a jury trial.
The role of attorneys and judges may also be different in space. One
of the primary factors involved in determining procedural "fairness" is
whether the decisionmaker is neutral and detached. 230 The Supreme
Court has held, however, that a single hearing officer or agency may
serve both an investigative and adjudicative function.23' These holdings
may be significant in determining the role of attorneys and judges in
space.
In space, there will probably not be enough litigation to occupy a
full time legal or judicial staff; therefore, attorneys and judges will per-
form other occupational duties in the space community. In addition,
judges may be called upon to play a more active role in the factfinding
227. T.N.T. Marine Service, Inc. v. Weaver Shipyards & Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F.2d 585,
587 (1983); FED. R. Civ. P. 38(e). This federal rule is not limited by the party's right to ajury
trial pursuant to the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution, which states: "in suits at com-
mon law.., the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. . . ." Admiralty suits were not
common-law suits. See supra note 197. Since space suits did not exist at common law, it may
be asserted that Congress can deny the right to a jury trial in a civil dispute without having to
require all individuals desiring to travel into space to waive their seventh amendment rights.
228. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a jury trial when-
ever her sentence results in more than six months imprisonment or more than a $500 fine.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (permitting denial of a right to jury trial in
criminal trials involving petty offenses). Therefore, Congress may deny a defendant the right
to a jury trial so long as the actual sentence imposed does not exceed these limits. Congres-
sional denial of the right to a jury trial may also seem more justifiable in light of the likely
partiality of the space community members. The partial nature of the trial would directly
interfere with the spirit underlying the Sixth Amendment-to provide a fair and impartial
trial.
229. See supra notes 217-219 and accompanying text.
230, J. NOWAK, supra note 98, at 487.
231. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982) (applying the Mathews v. Eldridge test);
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-54 (1975).
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process, setting aside their detached role. Judges may be expected to ask
the parties questions and to inquire more about the issues presented.
They may also need to do some of their own investigation, depending on
the role of the attorneys during the process.232 In hearing cases concern-
ing psychological-personal disputes, judges would act as counselors and
would have to deal with intimate subjects requiring a more sympathetic
ear than in more traditional disputes.
Although speedy resolution would foreseeably demand that most
dispute resolution occur in the space station itself, more complicated or
serious legal issues may require earthside resources to assist in the truth
finding process. The space station may choose to gain access to earthside
resources by satellite, or to send the parties and evidence to Earth for the
dispute to be decided, if necessary, by a disinterested or more competent
court. This latter option may depend on the location of witnesses and
evidence, and the need for involvement by space community members.
As the need for dispute resolution in space increases, the need for more
legal and judicial resources in space will also increase, making resolution
in space feasible under more diverse circumstances.
In addition, the space community may require a modified fourth
amendment analysis.233 Since people living in the space station will not
have the same expectation of privacy234 as on Earth,235 and since compli-
ance with procedures used on Earth will be too inhibitory, the standards
for obtaining evidence may need to be relaxed.
In determining the constitutionality of alternative procedures af-
forded in space, courts will have to consider the Mathews balancing test.
It appears, however, that the space community's need for speedy resolu-
tion and procedural innovation may, under certain circumstances, out-
weigh the importance of innovation and the risk of violating certain civil
liberties or property interests. Thus, some procedural deviations may be
constitutionally valid, depending on the extent of the deviation and the
nature of the interest involved.
232. See infra notes 238, 242 & 245 and accompanying text.
233. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protects the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures).
234. In examining whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a case, courts look at a per-
son's "expectation of privacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Presently, and
probably in the future, crew members will have little expectation of privacy. For example, on
space shuttles, the crew members' activities are monitored by camera by the ground control
crew. Stiennon, supra note 217, at 11.
235. In a space station, the living quarters may resemble those of a submarine: small space,
often shared by many. For example, on submarines, people often sleep in beds on a time rota-
tional basis: as one sleeps, another, having the same bed assigned, works. See March, supra
note 151, at 82 n.45; Lloyd, Submarines and Spacefarers-A Suggested Analogy, 14 LINCOLN
L. REv. & WHITE'S INN CHRON. 47, 49 (1983).
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4. Three Alternative Judicial Models
In establishing a space government, Congress should examine alter-
native dispute resolution procedures which have aided overburdened ju-
dicial systems on Earth. Four alternative juridical systems merit
discussion, as analogous systems in space may be effective in expediently
resolving disputes.
a. Small Claims Court Model
The first system is the California Small Claims Court, 236 which is
designed to resolve efficiently and informally all disputes involving stakes
worth less than $1,500.237 To maintain an informal judicial environ-
ment, parties may not be represented by an attorney in court, 238 and only
the defendant may appeal the final judgment of the court.239 This system
requires minimal judicial and legal resources.2'
The informal nature of adjudication under the Small Claims Court
model would be advantageous in space, where the environment will be
volatile, and where there will be a need to obviate as much as possible the
tension created by the litigation process. By eliminating much of the
adversarial nature of dispute resolution, the Small Claims Court model
would permit opposing parties to work together after the resolution with-
out much tension.
b. Arbitration Model
A second method of alternative dispute resolution is arbitration,241
which encourages the resolution of problems outside of the courtroom to
save judicial and legal resources. The arbitration system provides for
both binding and nonbinding awards. In binding arbitration, parties may
be represented by counsel, 242 and unless the parties agree otherwise, they
236. The California Legislature established the Small Claims Court because it believed that
"in order to resolve such disputes in an expeditious, inexpensive, and fair manner, it is essential
to provide a judicial forum accessible to all parties directly involved in resolving such dis-
putes." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.1 (West 1982). See also Note, Dispute Resolution in
Space, supra note 113, at 232-33.
237. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.2 (West 1982). In order to promote the use of this
efficient adjudicative procedure in outer space, Congress should eliminate the $1,500 maxi-
mum as a jurisdictional limit.
238. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 117.4 (West 1982). However, the parties may seek legal
counsel prior to and outside of the hearing.
239. Id. § 117.8(a).
240. Id. § 117(a).
241. In arbitration proceedings, there is usually a neutral arbitrator who hears the evidence
and arguments for all parties involved and determines the parties' rights and obligations ac-
cordingly. F. ELKOURI, How ARBrrRATION WORKS 118 (4th ed. 1985).
242. See, eg., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.4 (West 1982).
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are permitted to move to vacate the arbitrator's award.243 The binding
arbitration system is consistent with the belief commonly held in the
United States that an adversarial proceeding before a judge and with the
assistance of counsel is the best truth finding process. 2"
In a space station environment, the use of attorneys in the binding
arbitration process may cause too much tension and hostility among par-
ties. The binding arbitration system might be more feasible when more
attorneys are living in space, and the space community becomes less vol-
atile; until then, however, a system not requiring lawyers would be best.
Most arbitration disputes fall into the nonbinding category.
Although in nonbinding arbitration parties have a right to counsel, under
most private arbitration agreements, parties waive their right to have at-
torneys present, 245 and may not have an award vacated unless abuse of
the arbitrator's discretion is shown.2 46 Therefore, in most circumstances,
arbitration procedures resemble the Small Claims Court system-both
systems apply informal evidentiary rules247 and provide a setting in
which few legal and judicial resources are expended.
c. Hybrid Small Claims Court-Arbitration Model
Like the Small Claims Court model, the nonbinding arbitration
model may prove to be advantageous in the initial stages of the space
station's development. In space, a hybrid Small Claims Court-arbitra-
tion model may be desirable. This model would incorporate the advan-
tages of each system, including those advantages in which the two
models overlap. Under this model, (1) informal evidentiary rules would
apply; (2) both parties would have a right to seek counsel outside of the
243. See, e.g., id. § 1285. In California, in order for an arbitration settlement to be valid
and enforceable, the parties must agree in writing to be bound by the arbitrator's decision. Id.
§ 1281. In space, Congress should eliminate this requirement of a written agreement. Instead,
Congress should make an agreement to arbitrate a condition precedent to being allowed to
travel into space.
244. Courts have more readily emphasized the importance of the adversarial process in
relation to criminal trials. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court stated:
In giving meaning to the requirement [of providing effective assistance of counsel],
... we must take its purpose-to ensure a fair trial-as the guide. The benchmark
for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so under-
mined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied
on as having produced a just result.
Id. at 686.
However, the adversarial system is also significant in civil trials as a basic feature of the
United States common law tradition. See generally Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, in J.
MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERI-
CAN LEGAL SYSTEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS 651-61 (1978).
245. See F. ELKOURI, supra note 241, at 169.
246. Id. at 87-88.
247. Id. at 296-300 (arbitration system); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 116.8(a) & 117 (Deer-
ing Supp. 1986) (California Small Claims Court system).
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proceeding, but inside the proceeding counsel would be permitted only
where the judge deemed an attorney's participation to be necessary to
satisfy due process requirements; (3) the judge's decision would be bind-
ing and final; and (4) both parties would be able to appeal the judge's
determination, but to have the determination vacated, an appellant
would have to meet a more exacting standard than that used on Earth to
show the judge's abuse of discretion.
d. Mediation and Community Board Review Model
The fourth method involves mediation. In mediation an impartial
party facilitates discussion between parties involved in a dispute.248 The
mediator helps the parties "resolve their dispute in an informative and
consensual manner." '249 Mediators do not make a final decision, but
rather listen to the parties, hear their cases, and direct the parties in for-
mulating their own solution.25
In space there are two types of mediation which may prove useful:
mediation by a community board and mediation by a professional media-
tor. In community board mediation, neighbors of the parties would serve
as mediators. This would allow the community to be involved in resolv-
ing controversies affecting the space station. Unlike the formal judicial
system which compels community members to serve as jurors, commu-
nity boards allow interested members to help parties agree to a workable
solution.
Since the community will have an exalted status in a space sta-
tion,251 group involvement in handling personal disputes could prove ad-
vantageous. In light of the volatile nature of the space environment,
however, personal matters will affect the entire group more than they do
on Earth, and thus it may be best to isolate disputes from the rest of the
community. Further, for the same reasons that a jury trial in space may
248. See, eg., American Bar Association, Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in
Family Disputes, 18 FAMILY L.Q. 363-68 (1984), reprinted in L. KANOWITZ, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION 926, 928 (1985) (part III states that the
mediator has a duty to be impartial); American Arbritation Association, Commercial Media-
tion Rules, reprinted in L. KANowrrz, supra, at 922 (rule 5 describes impartiality as one of the
qualifications of a mediator).
249. American Bar Association, Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Dis-
putes, supra note 248, at 926.
250. See L. KANOWITZ, supra note 248, at 78.
251. In a space community, members' actions will affect the entire space society more than
they do on Earth. In space, people will rely on other members to perform their duties and for
social interaction. Hence, disputes among crew members will affect the environment and qual-
ity of life of the entire space community. For these reasons, societal values will be more likely
to outweigh individual values in space than they would on Earth. Bringing these values into
the dispute resolution process, therefore, may be beneficial for the group's welfare. See supra
note 219 and accompanying text.
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prove to be abusive,252 recommendations by a community board may be
disadvantageous in the early stages of space settlement. Yet, when the
space community becomes larger and more impersonal, the community
board system may become an acceptable alternative.
While the community is still small, mediation by a professional me-
diator may be a reasonable alternative. This system would permit a pro-
fessional mediator to facilitate discussion between parties, thereby
obviating the potential abuse inherent in the community board system.
e. An Analysis of the Judicial Models and Their Possible Application in
Space
The four models of alternative dispute resolution and the traditional
model of formal adjudication are useful as a judicial framework in space.
In applying the Mathews test,253 the space station will be able to deter-
mine which models will be appropriate to adjudicate different types of
claims. In general, where parties have less at stake in the proceeding,
courts can deviate more from the traditional model of formal adjudica-
tion. For instance, mediation may be a desirable method for civil disputes
of a smaller magnitude, or where the parties to a dispute are prepared to
compromise. Mediation may also prove useful to resolve psychological-
personal claims in which the court will be asked to perform the role of
counselor, helping the parties to resolve their personal disputes. For civil
disputes of a greater magnitude, criminal trials involving misdemeanors
or infractions, or controversies involving parties who refuse to compro-
mise, having a judge-like figure make a final determination may be neces-
sary. In this system a hybrid Small Claims Court-arbitration system
would be constitutionally valid. In civil disputes of the greatest magni-
tude or for criminal trials involving felonies, a proceeding resembling for-
mal adjudication may be required. In the latter case, the space station
may need to send the trial-parties, evidence, and witnesses-to Earth
for resolution by a more resourceful body in order to afford the parties
the due process they deserve under the Constitution. Since a formal trial
requires more time than an alternative method of dispute resolution, the
space station will need to have people sent from Earth to substitute for
the parties attending the litigation.
IV. Problems with State Legislation and Jurisdiction in Space
A. State Legislation
Traditionally, states have regulated activities affecting the residents
of their states. In areas of tort, criminal, contract, real property, and
estate law, state legislation dominates; Congress has not interfered with
252. See supra text accompanying notes 194-195 & 226-228.
253. See supra text accompanying note 225.
the states' authority unless necessary to exercise an enumerated power
under the Constitution or to protect a strong federal interest." 4 Where
necessary, however, congressional legislation may preempt state law
since federal law is the supreme law of the land.255 To preempt state law,
Congress may either explicitly state its intent,256 or implicitly do so by
pervasively regulating a particular field of law.257
In space, it may be necessary for Congress to exercise its authority
to preempt state law in all areas, even those traditionally within a state's
police power. This means, for example, that Congress would enact laws
concerning tort liability, criminal punishment, contractual enforcement,
transfer of property, and administration of estates, for any actions suffi-
ciently related to space activity. State legislation in space may interfere
with the federal government's goal of establishing a foundation for a via-
ble and prosperous space community, and would thus impede a strong
federal interest.
The problems involved with concurrent federal and state legislation
are illustrated by an example concerning the states' taxing power. In a
recent California decision, Communications Satellite Corp. v. Franchise
Tax Board2"' (COMSAT), the court of appeal upheld the state's inclu-
sion of a satellite, as property, in the corporation's unitary tax base. Ac-
cording to the court, "[tihere is an invisible, but apparently continuous
and very real, connection between the earth station and the satellites."25 9
Through this "contact" with the state, the state may justify its authority
over the activity.
Decisions like this one threaten the viability of a stable American
presence in space. By applying the COMSAT standard, almost every
state can find some "invisible" link to property located in space in order
to justify the property's inclusion in its tax base. This sort of legal uncer-
tainty, disuniformity, and assertion of state authority would impede na-
tional progress in space.
Although it may be reasonable to allow states to tax space property
or income which is clearly derived from the states, state taxation or regu-
lation of other space activities becomes unjustifiable as more property
254. See, eg., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) ("dealing with crime is
much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government"); Elkhart Engi-
neering Corp. v. Werke, 343 F.2d 861, 868 (5th Cir. 1965) ("state has a substantial interest in
providing a forum to redress tortious injuries.").
255. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978);
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 495 (9th Cir. 1984).
256. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208, (1985); Ray, 435 U.S. at 157; Ham-
mond, 726 F.2d at 486.
257. Ray, 435 U.S. at 157; Hammond, 726 F.2d at 488-89; Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v.
City of Burbank, 457 F.2d 667, 671 (1972), aff'd, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
258. 156 Cal. App. 3d 726, 203 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1984), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 1201,
reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 (1985).
259. Id. at 748, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
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and income is located in space and ties to the state become attenuated.
Instead, the federal government should benefit from the collection of
these taxes. Since the space community will require expenditures to
maintain itself, it would be more practical to allow the federal govern-
ment to raise the revenue via taxation of space activities. Thus, the fed-
eral government can allocate the tax revenue toward the maintenance of
the space community.260
Constitutional theory also militates against state interference in the
regulation of space activities that may impede federal interests in estab-
lishing an American presence in space. State legislation would threaten
federal authority over treaties, foreign commerce, and national defense.
The Framers of the Constitution intended that the federal government
have control over foreign affairs and foreign commerce because of the
importance for the Nation to "speak with one voice ' 261 in international
affairs. If states were allowed to enter into treaties or regulate foreign
commerce, then the United States would have several coexistent and pos-
sibly inconsistent policies with foreign nations, potentially undermining
the national policy or even the policy of another state. Obviously, such
chaos would destroy the credibility of the United States and interfere
with any meaningful diplomacy efforts.
Moreover, through its power over national defense and its interest in
maintaining technological superiority, the federal government, and not
state governments, should finance and conduct research in space technol-
ogy. State regulation of technological matters may decentralize space ex-
ploration and thus weaken the federal government's control over the
information gained by space research. Misuse of information could
threaten national and international security. As the United States settles
in space, Congress could further justify its legislation over defensive
space activity by pointing to the space station's need for military assist-
ance to protect it from attack.
State regulation may also violate equal protection principles. Equal
protection requires "that similar individuals be dealt with in a similar
260. In Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486 (1904), the Supreme Court held that Congress
had the authority to decide how to distribute the revenue accumulated from the Alaskan
territory:
[I]f the [congressional] act had provided for a local treasurer to whom these local
taxes should be paid and directed that the proceeds be used solely in payment of the
necessary expenses of the government of Alaska, its constitutionality would be clear,
but the contention is that the statute requires that the proceeds of these licenses shall
be paid into the Treasury of the United States, from which, of course, they can only
be taken under an act of Congress making specific appropriation.
Id. at 492. Congress may, therefore, choose to allocate all the revenue to the territory itself for
its expenditures. Consequently, Congress may treat space like the Alaskan territory and allo-
cate all space revenue towards the payment of space expenditures.
261. Japan Line v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).
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manner by the government. 26 2 When treating similar people differently,
governments must show that classifications are not "based upon imper-
missible criteria or arbitrarily used to burden a group of individuals.
263
Both the state and federal governments are bound by equal protection
principles.
264
In space, making the choice of governing law dependent upon an
individual's place of origin would be impractical and could violate equal
protection principles. For example, if one community member commits
a tort against another, the wrongdoer should be treated the same as any
other community member who commits the identical act. State regula-
tion of space activities would create an inherent unfairness among the
space community members because of the disparate treatment of space
dwellers with different state origins under similar circumstances. Federal
regulation, however, would apply uniformly to all members and would
avoid inconsistent outcomes.
B. Concurrent Jurisdiction
State and federal courts traditionally have exercised concurrent ju-
risdiction over some matters involving federal law.265 The two primary
policy reasons for allowing state jurisdiction over space activities are: (1)
to provide a forum; and (2) to permit states to retain some control over
space activities. States have an interest in activities affecting their citi-
zens, and they have a corresponding duty to provide a forum.266 The
states' duty to provide a forum corresponds with their citizens' duty to
pay taxes. With greater activity in space, and assertion of state authority
to tax space activity,267 states may argue that it is their duty to hear cases
arising in space to justify their taxation of space activity. Concurrent
jurisdiction would also allow the states to retain some control over space
development. Although states will not have much authority to prescribe
regulation over space activities, they may nevertheless retain some influ-
ence over space development via judicial interpretation of the federal leg-
262. J. NOWAK, supra note 98, at 525. See also Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474
(1968).
263. L. NOWAK, supra note 98, at 525. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683
(1973) (plurality); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971).
264. Although the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to
the states, the Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which
applies to the federal government, to contain an equal protection component. The standards
under both clauses are identical. See, eg., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). To hold
otherwise would demand higher standards of the state governments than of the federal govern-
ment. Id. at 500.
265. For example, states have concurrent jurisdiction over contracts, torts, and state or
federal tax matters. See supra note 179.
266, When citizens are burdened by state regulation they may reasonably expect that the
states confer benefits on them, such as resolving disputes arising under such regulation.
267. See supra notes 258-259 and accompanying text.
SDrin 1987] SPACE SETTLEMENT
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
islation. Unless the legislation is extremely comprehensive, judge-made
law can be particularly significant in developing new areas of law.
The costs of having concurrent jurisdiction outweigh its benefits.
First, jurisdiction by state courts will not provide states with much addi-
tional opportunity to exercise authority over space activities because rep-
resentatives in Congress, elected by the people of the states and sharing
many of the people's concerns over local issues, will still protect the
states' interests in Congress when legislating on space development.268
Second, the court docket overload in certain states may prevent the states
from resolving disputes in an expedient, efficient manner in cases arising
in space, where time is of the essence, and an efficient resolution method
is imperative.269 Federal interests in the development of a space commu-
nity require that the states be prevented from interfering with the imple-
mentation of federal space policy.
V. A Proposal for a Legal Order for an
American Space Settlement
A. The Need for a Legal Regime
Americans have begun to realize the technological and strategic ad-
vantages to be gained by an American presence in space, including the
eventual construction of a space station. However, the tragic explosion
of the Challenger on January 28, 1986, which killed all seven crew mem-
bers and annihilated the shuttle,270 called attention to the legal void con-
cerning space activities. If a similar event occurred in outer space rather
than in the Earth's atmosphere, the victims' families would not be certain
whether they had a cause of action for damages, and if so, whether that
cause of action would be governed by state or federal law.271
Knowledge of the governing laws and regulations in space would
assist the commercial community in determining the overall benefits of
participating in space activities. The private sector would be hesitant to
invest and manufacture in space without knowledge of the attendant
legal ramifications. The federal government must eliminate these uncer-
tainties before there is a greater physical presence or private sector par-
ticipation in outer space. In order to prevent instability from threatening
the realization of federal space policy, Congress must determine and de-
fine a legal regime applicable in space. Existing statutes will not be suited
268. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546, 550-54 (1985) (the
political process ensures that federal laws will not unduly burden the states; people from the
states elect the representatives to federal government). See supra note 150 and accompanying
text.
269. See supra notes 217-219 and accompanying text.
270. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
271. See infra note 296 for a discussion of the crew members' limited rights to recover
damages for injury incurred in space.
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to the needs of life in space; they are tailored to meet the conditions on
Earth and the types of legal problems arising here. In a space station,
people and entities will engage in activity heretofore unimagined on
Earth. Thus, a "legal vacuum" '272 will exist and will need to be filled.
Without a coherent body of laws covering space activities, the gov-
ernment may encounter constitutional obstacles in the enforcement of
current laws in space. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments2 73 require that citizens have "notice" of the laws
governing their activities before they are held responsible for obeying or
violating such laws.274 This constitutional notice does not currently exist
regarding space activities.
B. The Establishment of a New Polity Modeled
after a Federal Territory
The space station can be analogized to a federal territory: the sta-
tion will be governed by the federal government, not subject to any
state's claim of sovereignty. The primary reason for this analogy is a
national concern over the development of a space community. In areas
ranging from commerce to national defense, a presence in space will af-
fect the lives of all Americans. It is therefore logical that Congress
should maintain control over the American presence in outer space.
It would be consistent with the Constitution for Congress to estab-
lish a new polity in space wholly governed and controlled by Congress.275
Although the current space treaties may need to be revised to allow for
space settlement,276 a United States constructed space community would
probably not be viewed as inconsistent with the spirit of the space
treaties.
217
In designing the new polity to resemble a federal territory, Congress
would enact all laws applicable in space and establish a governing body
in space to enforce such law. In doing so, Congress would have to con-
272. A "legal vacuum" is a gap in existing law, both statutory and common law. For
instance, when there is no existing law on a particular subject, a "legal vacuum" arises as to
whether the subject matter is regulated at all. Zieman, Legal Vacuum: Lack ofLaw May Slow
the Use of Outer Space By Private Enterprise, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
273. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (Fifth Amendment: "No person shall be... deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law; Fourteenth Amendment: "No State shall
... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
274. "Due Process requires that all 'be informed as to what the state commands or forbids,'
... and that 'men of common intelligence' not be forced to guess at the meaning of the crimi-
nal law." Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974). See also Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
275. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
276. See supra text accompanying note 131-132 & 145 for a discussion of the effects of
classifying the space community as a United States territory under Article 2 of the Outer Space
Treaty.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 116-118, 131-32 & 145.
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sider the unique conditions and needs of a space environment. For in-
stance, at first the presence in space will involve property more than
people.27 A few individuals will live in the station for short periods of
time;279 thus, laboratories and manufacturing will operate with little
human assistance. Since most activity will still be supervised on Earth, it
might be practical for earthside authorities to continue regulating space
activities. Therefore, the space community, dependent on earthside re-
sources, will resemble a federal territory which looks to the federal gov-
ernment for assistance.280 Using the three territorial models as a basis
for comparison,281 Congress should treat the space community as a terri-
tory and regulate all space activities. Which model is ultimately selected
will depend upon congressional plans for the settlement's future.28 2 This
Note, however, suggests that Congress focus on the trust model,283 so
that the space community may someday act as a sovereign international
entity. Until the settlement attains sovereignty over its confines, Con-
gress can delegate increasing authority to the growing space community,
allowing the community to make independent decisions affecting the set-
tlement.2 4 The settlement's unique characteristics may nevertheless re-
quire Congress to design an entirely new territorial structure.
C. A Federal Code
In order to protect federal interests in space development, Congress
should establish a commission to promulgate a Space Code. The com-
mission should define the scope of activities to be covered by the legisla-
tion and the form that the legislation should take. In addition, the
commission should give close scrutiny to constitutional issues arising out
of the promulgation of such legislation. 28 5 The resulting legislation
should be in the form of a Code: a separate, coherent body of laws deal-
ing directly with a new subject matter and circumstance-space activity.
Congress should not be constrained by limits geared toward addressing
situations occurring on Earth. Instead, Congress should start with a
clean slate, using existing laws as a starting point or for comparison.
Due to the rapid technological progress in space, the Code's draft-
ers, like the constitutional Framers, should use language subject to con-
temporary interpretation in order to make the Code a "living"
278. Note, Dispute Resolution in Space, supra note 113, at 214.
279. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 55-96.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
283. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
284. Note, Dispute Resolution in Space, supra note 113, at 214.
285. For example, in upholding the principle of federalism, the commision should be care-
ful not to infringe on states rights through the allocation of legislative and judicial authority.
See supra note 160.
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document.286 This would allow the political structure, defined by the
Code, to change from within to accommodate technological advances.
Thus, the Code would not need to be revised continually merely to en-
compass interim developments.
Assuming the space station will be completed during the 1990's,"s7
it is not too soon to begin working on the establishment of a new polity in
space and on the enactment of a Code that governs space activities. Con-
gress must allow time for the inevitable obstacles that accompany enact-
ment of comprehensive legislation. Also, congressional action should be
prompt to apprise the public of the Code's content. The private sector
must know immediately what the legislation will include so that it can
make appropriate plans and prepare itself to participate in space, both
during and after the station's construction.
Congress should design the new Space Code to preempt state law for
reasons of uniformity.2"8 Allowing states to regulate space activities
would create problems for the United States in the enforcement of its
treaties28 9 as well as in the execution of its policy in space.290 State in-
volvement would also discourage private investment in the area.291
286. In United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), Justice Stone described the interpre-
tation process for constitutional cases in the following manner:
R]n determining whether a provision of the Constitution applies to a new subject
matter, it is of little significance that it is one with which the framers were not famil-
iar. For in setting up an enduring framework of government they undertook to carry
out for an indefinite future and in all the vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men,
those fundamental purposes which the instrument itself discloses. Hence we read its
words, not as we read legislative codes which are subject to continuous revision with
the changing course of events, but as the revelation of the great purposes which were
intended to be achieved by the Constitution as a continuing instrument of
government.
Id. at 316.
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), Justice Story also expounded
the idea of the Constitution as a living document:
The constitution unavoidably deals in general language.... The instrument was
not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure
through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in the inscrutable
purposes of Providence. It could not be foreseen what new changes and modifica-
tions of power might be indispensable to effectuate the general objects of the charter;
and restrictions and specifications, which, in the end, prove the overthrow of the
system itself. Hence its powers are expressed in general terms, leaving to the legisla-
ture, from time to time, to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects, and
to mould and model the exercise of its powers, as its own wisdom, and the public
interests, should require.
Id. at 326-27.
287. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 255-257 & 261-263 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 261-263 and accompanying text.
291. Congress should clearly state in the preamble of the Code its intention to encompass
all space activities and to preempt any state law in the field. However, even if the intent to
preempt was not clearly stated, the comprehensiveness of the Code and the strong federal
interest, especially in uniformity, would allow the Code to preempt any state law in the area.
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Only certain conditions should trigger application of the Code.
These conditions are jurisdictional in nature; the Space Code would ap-
ply to a given situation only if the conditions are met. If the conditions
are not met, then the activity would be regulated under existing laws
enacted for Earth.
Some authorities propose a locational limit to define jurisdiction.292
This type of threshold is presently used to delineate airspace and territo-
rial waters.293 If a locational threshold test is adopted, current laws
would no longer apply if the activity occurs beyond a certain point in
space. However, there is disagreement concerning the locus of such a
threshold.294 Moreover, although this test seems reasonable at first
glance, it does not account for other important factors, such as the length
of a mission.
"Mission duration" has been suggested as another threshold.295
Voyages of short duration may not necessarily require a different form of
jurisdiction than those already existing on Earth. On shorter missions,
people could return to Earth where judicial resources, such as courts,
witnesses, legal texts, and libraries, are available. However, as the dura-
tion of the mission increases, there will be a greater need to resolve
problems promptly in space, where the parties are located.
The mission duration threshold is inadequate because it does not
account for the possibility of a grave or heinous occurrence during a
"short" mission. For example, imagine that a shuttle leaves Earth for a
mission of short duration and a fight breaks out between two crew mem-
The strong federal interest is evidenced by the federal government's duty to exercise its author-
ity in foreign affairs, interstate and foreign commerce, national defense, admiralty, and in regu-
lating its proprietary interest. See supra notes 99-176 and accompanying text.
292. See generally Cheng, The Legal Regime of Airspace and Outer Space: The Boundary
Problem Functionalism Versus Spatialism: The Major Premises, 5 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE
L. 323, 324-28 (1980).
293. In regard to airspace, the federal courts have stated that:
[t]here is a public right of freedom of transit in the airspace over privately owned
land beginning at the 500- foot level above the surface of the ground in uncongested
areas, and the public has the right to travel in this airspace with the same freedom as
it has to travel on the public highways or on navigable waters.
Speir v. United States, 485 F.2d 643, 646 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
In another federal court of appeals decision, the court stated a different method of deter-
mining an individual's rights over the airspace: "'the land owner, as an incident to his owner-
ship, has a claim to the superadjacent airspace' to the extent that a reasonable use of his land
involves such space." Palisades Citizens Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 420 F.2d 188, 192
(D.C. 1969). See also supra note 152 and accompanying text.
In regard to territorial waters, Congress has stated that the seaward boundaries of coastal
states shall be "a line three geographical miles distant from its coast line." 43 U.S.C. § 1312
(1982). See also supra note 39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the high seas
boundaries.
294. See Cheng, supra note 292, at 324-28; Note, Dispute Resolution in Space, supra note
113, at 212.
295. Note, Dispute Resolution in Space, supra note 113, at 213.
bers resulting in injury and a claim for battery. Due to the length of the
trip, the Code would not apply. Since no negligence was involved, the
crew members would have no recourse against the government.2 96 Thus,
the only recourse would be in state courts. However, most states apply
the law of the state where the tort occurred 297 and, because the tort did
not occur in any state,29 8 the parties would be left without a remedy.
The most reasonable threshold for applicability of the Code would
be the "sufficient relationship" threshold applied in admiralty law.299
The Code would apply as long as the nature of the activity was "suffi-
ciently related" to a space activity.3" The sufficient relationsip test is the
most reasonable alternative because it would incorporate some factors
from the other tests suggested. Under the sufficient relationship thresh-
old, a court would consider the location of the activity and the duration
of the person's stay in space, along with other factors,30 1 to determine
whether the activity bore a sufficient relationship to space activity. A
person engaging in a space related activity would thus know that the
Code governed his or her actions. Moreover, it would not be necessary to
go to a foreign state or nation to have a dispute judicially resolved.
D. Jurisdiction: Exclusive Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction
in Outer Space
Due to the strong federal interest in regulating space, Congress
should establish exclusive federal jurisdiction 30 2 to hear controversies
arising under the Code. Although jurisdiction over controversies similar
to those that will arise in space traditionally has been concurrent on
Earth, Congress should make federal jurisdiction in space exclusive for
reasons of expediency and expertise.
To achieve speedy and expert dispute resolution, Congress should
establish special federal courts, perhaps similar to the Bankruptcy,3 3 and
296. The Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982). This Act
creates a right to bring a suit in federal court under federal law for a federal government
employee's or agent's negligence. In the case of a fight, however, no negligence would be
involved. See id. § 2680(h) (excluding claims arising from battery). Therefore, on its face the
statute would not apply and plaintiff could not recover against the government.
297. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 comment e, at 420 (1971).
298. See id.
299. See, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 675 n.5 (1982); Petrou v.
United States, 529 F. Supp. 295 (D.C. Md. 1981); see also supra note 200.
300. See the discussion of the Kelly factors, supra note 200, used to help determine the
sufficiency of relationship.
301. Id.
302. Space jurisdiction should include any activity which is sufficiently related to outer
space. This test would examine whether an appropriate "nexus" exists between the activity
and the field of space.
303. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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Patent and Copyright,3" courts that would hear only controversies con-
cerning space activities. The expedient adjudication of disputes would
reduce the burden and tension on the space community as well as prevent
further exacerbation of the overcrowded dockets in the regular federal
court system. In addition, the infrequent and unique nature of the cases
arising in space would create a need for litigators and judges who are
experts in the field. Establishing a court that hears only cases concerning
space activities would make dispute resolution more efficient and benefi-
cial for the parties involved.
E. Alternative Judicial Systems
At first, when fewer lawyers and resources are available in space, an
informal method modeled after the California Small Claims Court, arbi-
tration, or mediation system would be best. Each of these systems would
be beneficial for certain types of disputes." 5 Congress, therefore, should
not choose only one system when creating a judicial system for space, but
should use all of these systems, as well as the formal, traditional adjudi-
cation system. Use of these systems would recognize and account for the
volatility of the environment as well as the community's need for speedy
dispute resolution. However, because of the particular needs of a space
environment, it still may be necessary to deviate further from the proce-
dural norms accepted on Earth to design an entirely new judicial system.
Conclusion
In the 200 years of its constitutional existence, the United States has
expanded its territorial boundaries many times. Each expansion has re-
quired Congress to examine the nature and needs of the territory and to
determine a governing order best suited for such an environment. As the
United States embarks upon a new era in space, Congress must consider
the unique characteristics of a space community in establishing a gov-
erning order.
Through its constitutional authority over treaty matters, federal
property and territory, interstate and foreign commerce, national de-
fense, and the high seas, Congress has broad power to regulate space
activity. In exercising its authority, Congress should enact a uniform
body of applicable laws so that instability and uncertainty do not plague
or inhibit the Nation's future.
The Constitution grants the federal courts authority to hear contro-
versies involving federal questions or treaties, diversity of citizenship,
and admiralty matters; it also delegates to Congress the power to regn-
304. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
305. See supra text part III(C)(4)(e).
late tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.3°6 In exercising its author-
ity, Congress should confer exclusive subject matter jurisdiction on a
special federal court to ensure expedient adjudication of all controversies
arising under the Space Code.
Congress has extensive constitutional authority to regulate activity
arising inside United States territories and military compounds. For
these areas, Congress may, where necessary, prescribe laws which deviate
from procedural norms. Due to the space station's volatile sociological
nature, Congress should examine alternative judicial systems and consti-
tutional procedural guarantees for application in space.
Both the Constitution and case law support the emergence of a new
Federal Space Code and subject matter jurisdiction for space activities.
Because the federal government has strong interests in this area, it can
easily justify retention of exclusive control over space activities. Only by
exercising exclusive control over the development of a space civilization
can Congress protect America's hope for a prosperous future in space.
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306. See supra note 178.
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